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ABSTRACT 
The GDPR, applied since 2018, has largely filled the gaps and shortcomings in personal data 
protection that existed under the 1995 Directive. However, additional measures are still needed to further 
harmonize the protection of personal data, as well as to correct the imbalance of power between data 
subjects and controllers. 
 
One of the options for providing real control of data subjects over personal data is a property regime, 
which by its nature implies the most complete right that has a binding effect on any third parties. The 
proportization approach was developed in American doctrine as an alternative to the tort system with 
limited application, and as a way to avoid a biased legislative process that reflected primarily the 
interests of lobbying companies. 
 
This study provides an in-depth analysis of the control tools that are already applied in the EU legal 
system. These tools are compared with the objectives of the Regulation and the prospects for their 
achievement by the already available mechanisms. It is done to assess how if property regime on 
personal data can provide something valuable for personal data protection purposes and if the property 
regime is (in)capable of resolving the set objectives in the context of the European legal order. 
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1 Сhapter 1. Introduction 
 
In the digital era, the problem of personal data protection reaches enormous scale. With the 
development of information technology, personal data became an asset that is worth money.1 
Nevertheless, the mechanism of effective protection has not yet been developed while the value 
of personal data is dramatically growing. One of the most controversial and ambiguous 
approaches to solving this problem is the extension of the property rights on personal data.   
 
This idea of data propertization originates from the US since 1970s. There is a different 
justification for the theory of the ownership of personal data. Some believe that with the help 
of propertisation, data owners will be able to regain lost control over their personal information. 
According to natural rights theory ownership on personal data would recover the essential 
connection between a person and the data that pertaining to him and create his personality. 
Others reckon that this is the only option to somehow overcome the limitations of political and 
legal system of the US.  Commenting on US legislation, Purtova notes that the data protection 
law is too confusing, contains rules that are different in sources, subject matter and applicability. 
In the US, they are trying to apply traditional rules of privacy protection to new relationships 
related to personal data. 
 
Proposals for regulatory reform suggested not to prohibit the collection and use of information, 
but to introduce the practice of fair use of data. For a long time in the United States there were 
no rules governing the use of data in the private sector, all rules covered only relations with 
authorities. And still the issue of establishing uniform data protection standards for private 
sector remains unsolved. The idea of data propertisation in the US is based on economic 
arguments and flaws of data protection legislation.2 
 
The situation with extensive data collection was exacerbated for various reasons, such as 
providing national security, social welfare, a new marketing system in which profiles were 
created to meet the needs of consumers. Moreover, the development of technology, the dramatic 
increase in the integration of the Internet into everyday life has enabled storage of bulks of data, 
data mining and processing, profiling without obstacles. Using various services on the Internet, 
                                                 




we consciously or unconsciously provide service providers with our personal data, most of users 
are not aware that all their digital behavior is tracked by data collectors.3 
 
Nevertheless, with implementation of property approach, new uncertainties, such as who is the 
owner of the data, arise? This problem is discussed in the work of Murphy, where he 
distinguishes two kinds of rules: non-disclosure and disclosure. Non-disclosure implies that a 
person (data owner) can control the dissemination of private information, while the second is 
that the control over personal data is initially concentrated in the hands of controllers. He thinks 
that an individual property right in personal information is the only alternative to no information 
privacy at all, and the law should intervene and allocate the initial entitlement.4 
 
These difficulties associated with the Information and Technology Revolution are also relevant 
for the EU. Discussions about the loss of control over personal data are also being conducted 
in Europe, this can also be demonstrated by the new General Data Protection Regulation which 
specially notes the importance of ensuring users control over their data. Therefore, it is also 
vital for Europe to develop its perspective on personal data propertisation because this is one of 
the possible tools at the disposal of law that can ensure users’ control on how their information 
is used.5 One of the scholars, Lessig back to the 1999 asserted that such a mechanism of 
protection will get accustomed to the European legal system, and the same tools that protect 
copyright in this sense could also be used to protect privacy. He assumed that the recognition 
of the fact that we have the ownership over the right will enforce stronger privacy protection. 
 
The main argument against the introduction of property right in personal data in the European 
context is that, unlike the US, the EU implemented a human-based approach to privacy right. 
Article 8 of the EU Charter of Fundamental rights explicitly consider data protection as a human 
right and shapes a framework of the right to personal data protection. The right to personal data 
protection as it is enshrined in law imposes other obligations on other parties. The controller or 
the processor of personal data has active obligations to process personal data. 
 
Technically, the Regulation does not contain provisions that preclude the possibility of vesting 
property right but neither it enshrined the property mechanism in its provisions. Some 
proponents of data propertisation assert that the ruling principle of the Regulation, and data 
                                                 
3Purtova 2010, pg. 193-196 
4Murphy 1996, pg. 2383-2384 
5Purtova 2009, pg. 2 
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protection system in general, of empowering data subject by giving them control over personal 
information is more reminiscent of property regime. And due to the vague concept of property 
right that can be applied to describe a relation of a control over some object, the property right 
on personal information is not necessarily contrary to the European perspective of data 
protection. 
 
Nevertheless, it is worth noting that the introduction of this system will require significant 
changes. Moreover, it is not clear whether the EU has a competence to force Member States 
into propertisation of personal information and to regulate property law.6 Unlike the US, the 
Directive 95/46/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 24 October 1995 and the 
General Data Protection Regulation that is formulated in compliance with a human right 
approach provide uniformed framework on protection of personal data for private sector while 
property law is left to the competence of Member States.7   
 
Moreover, presence of owner’s title is not the only possible mechanism for protecting data, 
especially since such an approach is questionably in line with the legal system. The model of 
property right proposed by Schwartz, according to which the owner cannot alienate his right,8 
can hardly be called a property right. Legislation must empower and give people real control 
over their data, such attempts are taken by the General Data Protection Regulation. People 
should perceive their data not as an object of property benefit, but as a value that must be 
protected from intrusion. Personal data should not be protected as an object of property, but as 
an integral part of the right to privacy, the right to self-determination. 
 
Current Regulation creates such a data protection system where individuals are given with the 
tools to manage information about themselves shaping their digital life, in all relations regarding 




                                                 
6Purtova 2010, pg. 199 
7EUROPEAN UNION CONSOLIDATED VERSIONS OF THE TREATY ON EUROPEAN UNION AND OF 
THE TREATY ESTABLISHING THE EUROPEAN COMMUNITY (2002) (2002/C 325/01), Article 295 
8Schwartz 2003, pg. 2092 
9Lazaro - Le Metayer 2015, pg. 19 
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1.1 The aim of the study 
 
The main goal is to resolve the issue of whether the property approach to the protection of 
personal data is the most effective in regard to the interest of the individuals to whom this 
personal data belongs. How the EU legal system will benefit from this approach, and what, if 
any, risks are associated with the property law approach. 
 
Also, with the entry into force of the General Data Protection Regulation, which is intended to 
strengthen the position of the data subject, giving him the tools to exercise control over his data. 
Therefore, it is necessary to assess the existing regulation, its principles and innovations, which 
can solve the current problems of personal data protection without the necessity to implement 
new revolutionary approach. 
1.2 Research questions 
 
The main questions of the research are the following: 1. Can personal data propertisation 
provide effective data protection in the EU? 2. Is proposed personal data proportization 
compatible with the EU legal system considering the fundamental right and human-centered 
approach of EU to personal data protection?  3. Can the regulation of property rights be 
extended to personal data? I 
 
In order to answer the main questions, a short introduction to personal data propertization 
concept will be given by looking at the US data protection regulation and reasons why the 
introduction of property right in personal data can be justified. Therefore, within this study, two 
sub-questions must be addressed: 4. What are the common features and differences in the 
protection of the personal data of the two legal systems? Such an insight has a significant impact 
in applying the personal data ownership approach. 5. Is property in personal data the only way 
of providing effective protection or it can be achieved by enhancing the users control over the 
use of their data? 
1.3 Limitations 
 
When familiarizing with the theory of personal data proportization, this research will not cover 
the theory of data commodification. The main attention will also not be focused on economic 
argumentation of data propertisation. The institute of property rights and the US approach to 
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the protection of personal data will be considered to the extent that they appropriately assess 
how the concept of proprietary regime on personal data corresponds to the EU fundamental 
right approach to data protection and if such a concept can effectively fill the gaps of EU data 
protection regulation (as it is expected within the US legal order). 
 
Considering the possibility of personal data to be an object of property right and accordingly to 
be protected under a property regime, the main problems and obstacles in the application of the 
property regime in the civil law system will be highlighted. Common law practice and traditions 
will be touched upon only for purposes of comparative analysis. Also, this study is not aimed 
at profound study of the history and development of property law in Europe. 
1.4 Methodology 
 
To answer the main question of the research if property in personal data is compatible with EU 
legal system, the dogmatic method will be utilized, the possibility of data ownership will be 
viewed in conjunction with the legislation and case law related to the protection of personal 
data and the property rights model. The study implies also legal pragmatism10, since the main 
focus is on challenging the merits and disadvantages of proportization of personal data as a 
more powerful tool for protecting personal data, as well as the effectiveness of this approach in 
the European context. It is also essential to employ comparative law method to carry out the 
analysis between the two different approaches in case of data protection that can impede the 
adoption of the theory emerged in the US legal doctrine. 
1.5 Literature Review 
 
Discussions about a proprietary approach to personal data protection have emerged in the 
United States. Most of the works used in this study are also by American legal scholars. To 
understand the reasons for the emergence of discussions, the shortcomings of the American 
legal system were highlighted, which were pointed out in the works of Bergelson, Solove, 
Gavison. Also, to get acquainted with the forms of property protection of personal data, Cohen 
and Newman’s articles were used, who believed that the property right to personal data 
contributes to the perception of the significance of personal data. Murphy, Schwartz, and 
Samuelson noted the importance of limited property rights and some default rules. 





The main source for describing the European system and approach to personal data protection 
was the GDPR itself. The research tried to disclose the content of the principles and main 
innovations of the Regulation. Analysis of the relationship between the right to privacy and the 
right to personal data protection was mostly based on the books of Andrej Savin, Serge Gutwirth 
and Mireille Hildebrandt. The Commission's report on the experience with the implementation 
of the GDDR over the past two years has provided a good insight into the challenges that have 
not yet been overcome by the GDPR. 
 
The most comprehensive research on the possibility of using the property approach to personal 
data protection in the European legal system was conducted by Purtova. However, her work 
clarified the advantages of the property regime in comparison with the 1995 Directive, and there 
are very few relevant works discussing the need to apply property approach after the application 
of the GDPR. Jacob M. Victor mapped the new approach in the light of the drafted Regulation. 
Schwartz's concerns about the effectiveness of the property regime were also used in this study 
because his doubts have not lost their relevance nowadays. The work of Rouvroy Antoinette, 
Poullet Yves has become the centerpiece of the link between fundamental rights and the right 
to personal data protection, thus providing a comprehensive understanding of the European 
approach to data protection regulation. And the work of Ritter Jeffrey, Mayer Anna provided a 
good basis for advocating the GDPR as an effective instrument for achieving the goals set by 
the Union in personal data practices. 
1.6 Outline 
 
The Second Chapter of this study fluently touches on the main challenges posed by the 
development of information and communication technologies, which are especially relevant in 
the context of the GDPR, namely the lack of transparency in the processing of personal data 
and the accountability of controllers and processors. The Third Chapter outlines the concept of 
property law in the civil legal system and its fundamental principles. The chapter also addresses 
the main intricacies of applying the property regime to personal data. The Forth Chapter of the 
study is devoted to the history and reasons for the emergence of the theory of proportization of 
personal data in the American legal system. Chapter Five is devoted to the protection of personal 
data in the European legal system, and in particular to the analysis and familiarization with the 
main act of the Union governing the fair processing of personal data. The Sixth Chapter 
discusses the potential for introducing a property-based personal data protection regime into the 
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European legal system, as well as the possible positive effect of a property approach to personal 
data. And the final Chapter Seven is devoted to the main research question, namely the necessity 



































2 Chapter 2: Threat of personal data protection 
 
The threat of a massive collection of personal information, about every action, preferences, 
lifestyle has been around since the nineteenth century. Commercial companies, in search of 
more effective marketing, began indiscriminate collection and processing of personal data on 
citizens that were collected by the state during the census. Today there are not only private 
enterprises that buy personal data for marketing purposes, but also entities whose business 
model consists of a collection of personal data and further sale to enterprises that need this data 
to implement an effective marketing strategy.11 And at the moment, the turnover in the 
secondary information market exceeds several billion dollars.12 
 
To some extent, it is possible to justify the wide business practice in gathering and processing 
personal data for solicited marketing in order to improve the quality of goods and services, 
bringing these goods and services in line with the requirements and expectations of users, which 
undoubtedly gives significant positive results in the development of a successful business. 
However, this is not the only practice of using users' personal information. Today, personal data 
is used not only for marketing purposes, but personal data is also considered to be a very 
precious asset, and enterprises are actively exploiting the value of personal data of their 
customers by transferring it to third parties in the information market. 
2.1 Lack of transparency 
 
The majority of the data subjects (the person to whom the personal data pertain) do not even 
suspect how much of their personal information is collected and processed for different 
purposes on a daily basis. Besides the information that data subjects themselves provide to 
various platforms, for example on social networks, or when making online purchases, an 
enormous amount of information about users’ preferences and lifestyle is collected by 
controllers (actors who are collecting and processing personal information) without due notice. 
 
New technologies make it possible to store an unthinkably huge amount of information without 
particularly high investments. With the help of cloud computing technology, it is not necessary 
for businesses to have their own servers for data storage, modern technologies allow to do it 
                                                 
11Solove 2001, pg. 1408 
12Solove 2001, pg. 1407 
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using programs located on someone else hardware.13 And it is obvious that very few of the users 
know where their personal information is stored, for what purposes, when it was collected, and 
by whom exactly. 
 
New technologies that has emerged for the past decades allow data controllers to make the data 
collection process invisible. Each person using a mobile device provides information about their 
geolocation to a number of different controllers completely unaware of it.14 Various mobile 
applications have access to the user's contact data or to the gallery. Not only behavioral 
information is readily available without the data subject's knowledge, but also sensitive 
information concerning health, political or religious beliefs, minority affiliation. 
 
The lack of transparency in operations performed with personal data deprives the data subject 
of control over data pertaining to him. That means that if the data subject is not aware of what 
personal information is available to third parties, the data subject will think twice about the 
actions that he takes since there is always a possibility that his every decision, every action is 
tracked. 
 
Observing every aspect of data subjects' lives would fundamentally destroy the existence of 
individual autonomy. If the data subject is deprived of the right to not disclose personal 
information, to keep it secret, then he will adjust his life, his behavior, and his personality to 
"normal" standards for fear of negative consequences.15 
 
For instance, with the help of profiling, the process of categorizing individuals or groups of 
people based on certain criteria, not only compiles personal information into a single profile but 
also is able to predict behavior or preferences that are typical for a certain category of 
individuals or groups of people. Such a prediction can be made on the basis of already available 
information about an individual, or it can be made indirectly by judging the preferences or 
behaviors of people from a similar group.16 
 
                                                 
13COM(2010) Brussels, 4.11.2010 609 final, pg. 2 
14COM(2010) Brussels, 4.11.2010 609 final, pg. 2 
15Antoinette - Poullet 2009, pg. 47 




In Orwell’s world, there is no place for the right to self-determination and self-development, to 
individualism. A totalitarian regime that monitors its citizens is frequently used as an anticipated 
future by advocates17 for privacy and high standards of personal data protection. 
 
Lack of transparency and information about who, when, where, to what extent has access to 
personal information, and for what purposes it is used creates a huge imbalance of power 
between controllers and data subjects. Lack of transparency weakens the position of the data 
subject, while controllers gathering more information respectively gain more power.18 
2.2 The inefficiency of accountability rules 
 
The lack of transparency is caused by insufficient rules of accountability and responsibility of 
controllers. It is the controllers who decide what personal data they need and for what purposes 
in order to provide the data subject with certain services. That is, they should be held responsible 
for providing relevant information, which would make the process of collecting and processing 
personal data transparent and fair. In this case, the data subjects would have the freedom of 
choice, and, accordingly, would have some degree of control over the personal data. 
 
The problem of accountability is also caused by the complex and tangled chain of personal data 
flow from one controller to other actors (other controllers or processors19). In such a complex 
multilateral relationship, it is difficult to understand how responsibility and accountability for 
the lawful processing of personal data, as well as for taking appropriate measures to ensure the 
security of personal data are distributed. This problem is further exacerbated by the opacity of 
this chain.20 Thus, when a violation of the data processing rules is revealed, it is difficult to find 
out at what point of that chain the violation occurred and to figure out who was included in this 
flow of personal information, and who is responsible for the violation. 
 
As noted above with cloud computing, controllers carry out various operations with personal 
data not only by their own means but also by utilizing outsource services. That is, the modern 
practice of data processing is immensely complicated, and for and an incompetent data subject 
defending his rights and interests in the event of a violation becomes merely impracticable 
                                                 
17Solove 2001, pg. 1414 
18Regan 1995, pg. 2 
19GDPR Article 4(8) ‘a natural or legal person, public authority, agency or other body which processes personal 
data on behalf of the controller’ 
20Purtova 2011, pg. 49 
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3 Chapter 3: Property right 
 
In the legal doctrine, discussions are gaining momentum about a new generation of personal 
data protection regulation through the implementation of a well-known property regime. It is 
assumed that property rights are best able to provide real control over personal data by allowing 
the owner himself to enter into negotiations with the actors of the information industry. This 
would allow the data subject, that is, the owner, to control and decide on the conditions on 
which he would like to give his consent to the disclosure and use of personal information 
pertaining to him. Property rights will be able to best reflect the interests of the data subject in 
relations with the controllers. 
 
Nevertheless, even though the property regime assumes indisputable control over property, the 
first concerns appear with the possibility of applying the institution of property rights to new 
relations and objects. The question arises if it is possible to extend the property regime to new 
relations that are not enshrined as property relations in the statutes. Furthermore, the nature of 
personal data also raises questions as to if data can be regarded as a new object of property 
right, especially given their intangible nature. How flexible is the institution of property rights 
to cover the relationship on the use of personal data of data subjects by other actors in the 
information market? 
3.1 European property law: main principles 
 
The institution of property law is left to regulation by the competent authorities at the national 
level by the Member States. There is no supranational legal act that would harmonize the 
general concepts of the property regime, as well as its basic principles. However, all the legal 
systems of the Member States share common features that are inherent to any property 
relationship. 
 
The right to property grants its owner the exclusive right to exercise power over the fate of the 
property belonging to him.21 Mainly, the property law divides the property into the category of 
movable and immovable property,22 from which it follows that the objects of property rights 
are tangible things.23 
                                                 
21van Erp 2012,  pg. 13 
22Akkermans 2008,  pg. 91 




Property rights are considered the most comprehensive and full rights because according to the 
inalienable principle of erga omnes, the property rights of the owner are opposed to and can be 
forced against any third parties. Therefore, the right is also called the fullest right, its action has 
a binding effect for absolutely everyone. The owner has the right to exclude all third parties 
from interfering with the free exercise of his property right. Also, the owner is entitled to use 
and dispose of his property as he wishes. This right, however, is not absolute, its exercise is 
limited by the interests and rights of third parties, which may be harmed as a result of abuse of 
one’s property right. 
 
The opposite of property law is a personal right, or in other words, the law of obligations, which 
imposes obligations only on the parties to the corresponding agreement,24 and contracts are of 
short-term effect. Whilst property right is not limited in time, it lasts as long as the object of 
property rights exists.25 Property law is aimed at creating wealth, regulating the acquisition and 
distribution of wealth, so it is of great importance for owners that these property relations are 
stable and constant.26 
 
Since property right is the most burdensome right for third parties, it must also comply with the 
principle of transparency (which is further divided into the principle of specificity and the 
principle of publicity). This means that it must be clear and explicit which specific object is 
subjected to a property right, the object must be clearly defined. Thus, the fact of the existence 
of property rights to the object must be publicly available. For the overarching effect of a 
property right to have a real meaning, third parties must know in relation to which specific 
object there is a property right in order to refrain from any actions that prevent the right holder 
from exercising his right.27 
 
Each aforementioned principle is an integral characteristic of property law. However, there is a 
principle that resolves the question of applicability of the property regime to certain legal 
relations. This principle is a principle of numerus clausus, which initially determines the 
(in)applicability of other principles.28 
 
                                                 
24Akkermans 2008,  pg. 65 
25Purtova 2011 , pg. 67-68 
26van Erp 2009, pg. 2 
27van Erp - Akkermans 2012, pg. 75-76 
28Akkermans 2008,  pg. 5 
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The numerus clausus principle refers to legal restrictions on parties in the creation of property 
rights. This usually means that the national legislator has established an exhaustive list of 
property rights in a legal act (like Civil Codes of France, Germany, Netherlands). Such a closed 
system of property regime enshrines what property rights are permissible and determines their 
content. Therefore, the parties cannot create property relations that are not known by laws.29 
 
Principle numerus clausus has a more flexible application in the common law system. This 
principle in the common law system is not enshrined in the statute but is implemented in court 
decisions. Also, in the civil law system, the right of ownership is defined as the most complete 
form of the right. While common law recognizes the existence of different property  rights to 
the same object, also known as the concept of fragmented ownership in the legal doctrine.30 
Moreover, each such holder of a lesser right has its own claims to the same property object, and 
each of them is provided with the same level of protection.31 
 
Another important rule for fragmented ownership is the nemo dat rule. It lies in the fact that the 
holder of the lesser (meaning not full) property right cannot transfer more rights to the property 
than he has himself. The holder of the fragmented property right on an object cannot transfer 
full property right to this object to another person.32 
 
The system of  common law is recognized as a more flexible environment for accepting new 
property relations, but since the system of civil law reigns in the Member States of the Union, 
the fundamental point for the EU discussion is how open the civil law order is in order to apply 
a stricter  property regime to new relations that have arisen as a result of social-technological 
development. 
3.2 Flexible application of property right regime 
 
The property regime is a long-standing institution, and the principles described earlier also 
remain invariably relevant. With the incessant, rapid development of society, economy, culture, 
it is predictable to face a problem when new relationships appear, for example, due to the era 
of technological breakthroughs, and old legal mechanisms and tools are too rigid to embed them 
into new realities. 
                                                 
29Akkermans 2008, pg.  6-7 
30Purtova 2011, pg. 72 
31Purtova 2011, pg. 78 




Quite a few legal scholars33 have been concerned about the need to give the parties the freedom 
to create new property rights and determine their content. They also proposed to revise the 
principle of numerus clausus, which is the most limiting principle among other conditions. 
 
Sjef van Erp anticipated that with the emergence of new relationships, immensely stringent 
application of the principle of numerus clausus can lead to undesirable implications.34 The 
development of technology poses serious challenges for the policy and the lawmakers, the legal 
order does not keep pace with the dynamics of the development of society. If one takes an overly 
meticulous approach to the application of familiar mechanisms, it will be difficult to achieve 
effective regulation and protection of new relations. So, if one strictly adheres to the letter of 
the law, new objects created as a result of a technological boost, and which is of high value, 
may generally remain without legal protection. 
 
The classical model of property regime has proven effective in overcoming the feudal system 
by allowing the fair distribution of the wealth among the working class of citizens too.  To 
counterbalance the situation, the idea of fragmented ownership had to be abandoned.35 
 
Nevertheless, taking into account the current development of different aspects of the society,  
there is a new need to reshape property law again in order to ensure the interests of new owners, 
to effectively regulate the relations of owners in regard to new property objects. 
 
Such steps towards a new ownership model have already been taken, as evidenced by the less 
meticulous application of the principles of property law. Thus, the legislation provides a special 
regime to protect the interests of the legal owner (the creditor) and the economic owner (the 
debtor). The property can be transferred to another person for the purposes of property 
management (a trust). New property objects have emerged, such as information that has high 
economic value for businesses known as trade secrets, or the results of creative and intellectual 
work known as intellectual property.36 
 
These relations were not previously known at the time of the formation of the classical property 
                                                 
33
van Erp 2009, See also Akkermans 2008 
34
van Erp 2003, pg. 5 
35
van Erp 2009, pg. 14 
36
van Erp 2009, pg. 17-19 
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regime. However, progress and development contributed to the need to move away from the 
approach of a rigid application of the property regime. Therefore, today, the civil law system 
acquires more and more similarities with more flexible common law. 
3.3 Personal data as an object of property right 
 
Personal data is undeniably acknowledged as a modern asset of tremendous economic value in 
the information industry. The value of personal data, which gives controllers enormous power, 
is often misused and abused. The controllers do not give much regards to the subjects to whom 
this personal data pertains, the interests of the data subjects are not taken into account when 
processing and otherwise using valuable personal information. 
 
Due to such an imbalance in power, unfair consideration of the interests of the parties, it is 
assumed that the vesting the property right  in personal data with data subjects will contribute 
to the equilibration of positions of controller and data subject. The erga omnes principle in this 
context is the most essential since it will allow data subjects to use their dominion over their 
personal data against everyone. 
 
Nevertheless, personal data is not a conventional object of property right. That is why the 
discussion of the possibility of introducing property rights to personal data is associated with 
the concern about the possibility of personal data to be regarded as an object of property right 
takes the central place. 
 
Even if, as was suggested, it is possible to overcome the rigidity of applying the principle of 
numerus clausus, then there is another obstacle in the employment of the property regime, 
namely the principle of transparency. The principle of transparency as described earlier, 
stipulates that the property object must be clearly identifiable, must be specific, in order to 
provide legal certainty for other parties. 
 
There is a harmonized concept of personal data, enshrined in Article 4 (1) of the GDPR, 
according to which personal data is: 
 





As can be judged by the definition, the concept of personal data captures a huge range of 
different types of information that can be attributed to a natural person.  And at first glance, 
satisfaction with the principle of transparency seems very doubtful which is fundamental for 
the attribution of property right. The concept of personal data is overly broad and may introduce 
ambiguity in the specification of the object of protection. The situation is further aggravated by 
the constant development of technologies that enhance the ability to identify previously 
anonymous information.37 
 
The Working Party also noted the possibility of this shift from non-identifiable to identifiable 
data, also explaining this by technological advancement in the processing of data.38 
 
Also, the information has to relate to a natural person, data must be about a person. Personal 
information includes characteristics, the identity of a person, behavioral information, any other 
data that has an impact on the perception, assessment of this person by others. Moreover, 
personal information includes information that has an impact on the interests and freedoms of 
a person.39 In order to ensure high protection for data subjects’ interests, the legislator 
deliberately made the scope of the concerned concept broad. 
 
And lastly, conventionally the objects of property rights are tangible objects. In the digital age, 
this approach is too restrictive since online goods are not attached to a physical carrier in the 
online space. It is for this reason that the CJEU, taking into account the widespread use of online 
"goods", ruled that the sale or licensing of objects of intellectual property on the Internet also 
depletes the right of the copyright holder to exclusive distribution.40 Despite the fact that the 
Court did not explicitly recognize intangible objects as objects of property rights, certain steps 
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Despite the rigidity of the application of the property regime in the civil law system, the rapid 
technological, social, economic, and cultural progress indicates the need to reshape property 
law to meet the needs of the new reality. The opposite can be detrimental to the interests of the 
parties to the new relationship. New objects emerging from technological development have an 
extremely high economic value for both natural people and businesses, and property law is the 
most powerful tool for ensuring control over a valuable object and protecting economic interests 
of the rightholder. 
 
Personal data has proven its economic value to the information market. For the sake of seizing 
this value, controllers often abuse the position of data subjects, collecting and processing 
personal data unlawfully. 
 
Undoubtedly, the attribution of personal data to objects of property law seems to be quite 
problematic. The blurred boundaries of the concept of personal data and its intangibility impede 
compliance with the transparency principle, which is fundamental to the property regime. 
Nevertheless, CJEU has already taken certain steps to proportization of intangible objects, 


















4 Chapter 4: Motherhood of data propertisation theory 
 
In the digital era, the problem of personal data protection reaches an enormous scale. With the 
development of information technology, personal data became an asset that is worth money.41 
Nevertheless, the mechanism of effective protection has not yet been developed while the value 
of personal data is dramatically growing. 
 
Collectors are most interested in collecting personal, and in particular sensitive data for the 
further sale of a database of these data in the information market.42American scholars believe 
that citizens have lost control of their privacy and their personal data,43  and also excluded from 
the list of the stakeholders who benefit from the disposal of their personal data.44 
 
The main reason for the lack of consistent regulation of information privacy in the American 
legal system is the lack of a clear and concise understanding of the essence of an individual's 
interest in owning and protecting private information. While in the EU legal system, 
comprehensive regulation, and high standards of protection of information privacy is ensured 
by following the fundamental right approach to personal data protection.45 
 
In order to reaffirm the right to privacy and, in particular, the right to personal data protection, 
it is necessary to return control over personal data to the subjects of personal data. And there 
are several approaches presented in the legal literature on how the control over personal data 
can again be concentrated in the hands of the data subjects. 
 
One of the most controversial and ambiguous approaches to solving the problem caused by 
global technological breakthrough is the extension of the property right regime on personal 
data. Vesting property right to personal data can be a solution to the problem of determining 
interest in the protection of personal data.46 
 
This idea of data propertization originates from the US since 1970s. There is a different 
justification for the theory of introducing property right on personal data.  Some reckon that 
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this is the only option to somehow overcome the limitations of the political and legal system of 
the US. The theory of personal data propertization was put forward due to a lack of the rules 
governing the use of data in the private sector in the American legal system, all legal norms 
covered only relations with authorities or were addressed to specific sectors. And still the issue 
of establishing uniform data protection standards for the private sector remains unsolved. 
 
Others believe that with the help of propertisation, data owners will be able to regain lost control 
over their personal information. According to natural rights, property right approach on personal 
data would recover the essential connection between a person and the data pertaining to him. 
 
Within the framework of this chapter, those imperfections of the personal data protection system 
that have led to the compulsion of new measures to protect the right concerned will be discussed 
and analyzed. 
4.1 Shortcomings of the US information privacy regulation 
 
The need to respect an individual’s privacy was first announced in 1890 when American 
scholars Samuel Warren and Louis Brandeis published The Right to Privacy in Harvard Law 
Review,47 which substantiated the need for judicial protection of privacy from intrusion, similar 
to how it is protected good name from slander and libel. Shortly after publication, individual 
states gradually began to adopt civil law standards to protect privacy as an intangible good. 
 
The shortcomings of the US data protection system are associated with the highly fragmented 
US legislation.48 It does not have a single and coherent data protection framework but rather 
includes a bundle of  constitutional, federal, and state statutory and tort law.49 
 
The relations of citizens with private organizations collecting and processing personal data of 
users are regulated by federal laws relating to individual industries, for example, education,50 
telecommunications,51 banking,52 financial, medical53 and so on.54These laws are very harshly 
                                                 
47Warren - Brandeis 1890, pg. 193-220 
48Bergelson 2003, pg. 392-393 
49Fred H. Cate 1997 
50The Family Educational Rights and Privacy Act of 1974 ("FERPA") 
51The Cable Communications Policy Act of 1984 ("CCPA") of 1984 
52The Fair Credit Reporting Act of 1970 ("FCRA") 
53Health Insurance Portability and Accountability Act of 1996 ("HIPAA") 
54Solove 2001, pg. 1441-14443 
26 
 
criticized by privacy advocates, arguing the laws concerned were adopted under the great 
influence of lobbying companies operating in the respective industries whose interests are taken 
into account in the first place when developing regulation.55 
 
Moreover, disadvantages of legal regulation of the protection of personal data begin with the 
conceptualization of privacy. Even though that in the US legal system there are several acts 
regulating the processing of personal data in certain sectors, there is no single systemic and 
comprehensive act. 
4.2 Privacy Concept in the US legal order 
 
One of the main reasons for data propertisation theory emergence relates to how the data 
protection problem was conceptualized in the US.  Solove emphasizes in his work the relevance 
of the problem of the definition of the concept of private life. Some scholars give a narrow 
definition, while others include in private life a very diverse range of rights, such as the freedom 
speech and thoughts, the right to personal information, the inviolability of the home, and so on. 
Solove also cites very reasonable concerns about the progressive development of relationships 
that affect the privacy of each individual. And in such conditions, it is hard to define a concept 
so that it can provide an effective basis for the development of relevant legislation and law 
enforcement practice. In the absence of a clearly defined concept, it is difficult to establish the 
goals and principles of further regulation.56 
 
Solove believes that privacy should not be conceptualized using the general elements and 
principles of different theories of privacy, but rather a definition of privacy should be given in 
the context of those practices that affect privacy. Many theorists are trying to give a 
comprehensive definition of privacy, which would contain the basic elements of any 
relationship relating to the privacy of individuals, and Solove sees that approach as the main 
drawback of existing concepts of private life.57 
 
Historically, the US law adhered to a very narrow understanding of the right to privacy, where 
privacy was mainly identified with the issue of secrecy and the right to be left alone. 
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The first to determine the right to privacy were Warren and Brandeis, whose work became the 
foundation for further discussions of the concept of privacy in legal doctrine. The authors 
defined the right to privacy as the right of each individual to be left alone. They substantiated 
their theory by the fact that some actions that are possible due to technological progress cause 
a certain emotional pain to the person in relation to whom these actions were taken. That is, 
such actions violate not so much the individual’s right to receive material benefits from such 
publication, but violate his personal integrity, and cause mental torment for this individual.58 
 
The concept of privacy as secrecy was developed by Judge Posner, who reduced the right to 
privacy as the right of everyone to keep their affairs secret from the public, that is, to restrict 
third-party access to the self.59 This concept is fundamental to the right to information privacy. 
Thus, the right to information privacy is seen as the right to non-disclosure of personal 
information which was repeatedly supported in court decisions.60 Once the information has 
been disclosed to the public, there can be no more expectations that this information is private.61 
 
However, the total secrecy is extremely limiting the effectiveness of the application of this 
concept, since it does not allow the individual to choose whom he wants or does not want to 
disclose his information what considerably limits his freedom. To exercise the right to privacy, 
an individual must conceal his personal information from everyone.62 
 
Solove also noted that the right to informational privacy lies not only in the fact that the 
individual can decide who will be aware of the facts concerning his private life, but also the 
ability of this individual to decide how and for what purposes the information about him will 
be used.63 
 
Such a narrow concept of privacy protects the information that is kept secret, only in this case, 
the subject has the right to non-interference from third parties.64 Thus, as such, the data subject 
does not have control over his personal information, either he chooses to disclose his data, 
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transferring it to the public domain, or the subject must observe and protect the complete 
secrecy and confidentiality of his information from all parties without exception. 
 
According to Solove, one should not stuck with the idea to give a comprehensive definition of 
a certain concept. Such a complex approach has a risk of the rigid application. Relations change 
over time with the development of a society. There are a lot of factors that will appear and 
disappear, but which cannot be foreseen and taken into account beforehand. Therefore, Solove 
takes a pragmatic approach to conceptualize privacy, strives not to focus exclusively on the 
theory, since a theory without context, without practical application, does not have a high 
value.65 
 
He means that private life has its value in the context of a certain relationship. Some 
relationships require stronger protection of confidentiality, and sometimes excessive 
confidentiality can be detrimental in other cases,66 for instance, with domestic violence. 
 
According to some authors, the right to privacy is a tool to achieve a higher-end goal. Therefore, 
speaking of the extent to which the right to privacy is to be protected, it is first of all necessary 
to determine the goal that we want to achieve through the implementation and protection of this 
right.67 
 
The most appropriate way to defend users’ interests is to return the control over personal data 
to the data subjects, to decide for themselves who and on what basis can process personal 
information pertaining to him. And as some authors have noted, the problem with protecting 
personal data is that no one exercises control over it.68 
 
American legal scholars decades ago already predicted a rapid development of technology and 
the problems that would follow the era of information and communication technology. They 
noted that publishing personal information in the media is not the only threat to privacy. They 
already warned at that time that the right to non-disclosure of information is not enough, in the 
new technological generation, personal data subjects should be vested with the right to control 
the dissemination and use of the information pertaining to them.69 
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Theorist Alan Westin believes that this form of control should be carried out using the property 
right of personal information.70 In further consideration of the American tort system, it will be 
demonstrated that appropriation tort partially recognizes this data propertization approach in 
disputes of unlawful use of personal information for commercial purposes. 
 
Since each individual is a social being, every individual has an irresistible desire to be part of 
this society. But each individual must have freedom of choice, to whom, and to what extent to 
give them knowledge about self.71 
 
And speaking of the control of data subjects over personal information, this is not about absolute 
control without any interference from other actors. Absolute and unconditional control of data 
subjects can lead to adverse consequences, which can significantly infringe the essence of 
privacy. 
4.3 US tort system and right to data protection 
 
The US tort law, which plays a key role in privacy protection, also adheres to the narrow notion 
of privacy. It emphasizes the nature of the information which can get protection under the 
Fourth Amendment, only if such information is expected to be private, moreover, the court also 
takes into account whether society considers such expectations reasonable.72 Furthermore, the 
court in its decisions asserts that the person who voluntarily disclosed information to third 
parties cannot refer to privacy expectations in such information because the information 
concerned is no more private.73 It is obvious that the identification of the right to privacy, which 
encompasses informational privacy,74 with secrecy does not fit well in the days of constant 
information communication. 
 
For those who seek the protection of their information, there are four kinds of privacy torts 
defined by Prosser: intrusion upon seclusion, public disclosure of embarrassing facts, the 
appropriation of name or likeness, publicity in a false light.75 Decisions of the court within the 
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specified torts unequivocally demonstrate that none of them is capable to effectively solve the 
personal data related issues set by the scale of data processing and flow. 
 
To understand why none of the available options can be commonly applied to adequately protect 
information privacy, it is necessary to point out the significant shortcomings of each of them. 
 
In the case of the intrusion upon seclusion, the plaintiff must prove the fact of the highly 
offensive invasion in his solitude or private affairs. Even though it does not require the intrusion 
in physical space, the plaintiff cannot rely on information protection within the concerned tort 
if the data subject voluntarily communicated his personal information. Thus, the fact of the 
intrusion takes place only in case of unauthorized personal data collection. Although it might 
be also difficult to qualify unauthorized data collection as offensive to a person concerned if it 
was an innoxious collection of some neutral personal information because the court can find 
that the significant danger arises only with the consolidation of a large mass of information.76 
 
This tort can ensure the protection of the data subjects’ right from the collection of their personal 
data without the proper procedure, namely, without obtaining the consent of the data subject to 
collect his personal data.  Nonetheless, this mechanism is unable to address the issues of further 
data use and processing if that data has been once disclosed by the data subject.77 
 
In order to sufficiently regulate the modern relations of individuals with public and private 
controllers of personal information, the voluntary disclosure of their information should not be 
regarded as a deprivation of the right to privacy. If it is recognized that information privacy 
consists of possession of individual control over his personal data, then the fact of disclosing 
information will not entail the deprivation of control over information by the subject. Control 
will allow data subjects to restrict access to himself78 and to decide how his data can be used, 
to whom it can be transferred, decide on further dissemination of his personal data,79 regardless 
of whether his personal information was disclosed to a third party for any purpose before.80 
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Within the disclosure tort, in order to benefit from such a protective mechanism, the plaintiff 
has to prove that the information disclosed is of highly personal or offensive character what is 
hard to do considering that data collectors usually gather fairly neutral information. 
 
This form of tort will be effective in protecting particularly sensitive information regarding 
health, family secrets, personal life, the disclosure of which can bring their owner mental 
anguish.81 But since in most cases we provide neutral information about ourselves,82 and exactly 
the information about our lifestyle83 is particularly valuable for direct marketing purposes, 
disclosure tort cannot impose a universal tool of protecting any personal data but only a specific 
category of highly sensitive information.84 
 
The vague criteria that the court is guided by when considering cases of unlawful disclosure of 
personal information, namely, reasonable expectations of privacy, make this tort outdated. To 
date, a huge amount of personal information of users is transmitted to the controllers located 
outside the country. Reasonable expectations of privacy may not be the same for everyone; this 
concept has a great dependence on the social, economic, and political levels.85 A clear example 
is Safe Harbor86, an agreement between the United States and the EU governing matters with 
high personal data protection. The provisions of this agreement provide better protection of 
personal data to EU citizens than the American legal system for its citizens. This is clear proof 
that the expectations considered reasonable vary from country to country.87 
 
Moreover, it is not an easy task for the subject of personal data to discover the fact of 
transferring his personal information from one data controller to another.88 Usually such a 
transfer is carried out without the knowledge of the data subject.89 
 
The tort of the appropriation of name or likeness, in essence, protects the plaintiff’s right to 
benefit from the use of his name, which has some value due to the reputation, the image of the 
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person to whom the name belongs. Such protection is very similar to the protection of the 
owner’s interests in the use of his property.90 And according to some legal scholars91, 
appropriation tort and the right to publicity have a solid basis to talk about the possibility of 
introducing property rights to personal data. 
 
Nonetheless, appropriation tort also has limited application for data protection issues because 
it demands the exploitation of certain information for the defendant’s benefit since the tort 
concerned protects only the commercial value of used information.92 The court concluded that 
the tort does not protect the information itself but rather it protects the value of that information 
that might be used for advertising and business purposes.93 Moreover, within this tort, the court 
inferred in its decision that the name of the data subject has the value only after it is been 
collected and categorized by the defendant.94 
 
The appropriation tort does not protect the name of citizens as such,  but rather the value, 
reputation that is associated with this name is subject to protection.95 Thus, an ordinary citizen 
is unlikely to enjoy these legal remedies, because, unlike media personas, their image and 
reputation may not be of equal value. Nevertheless, the use of personal data of individual 
citizens in the direct marketing industry is commercially profitable.96 And in cases when, for 
example, the data collector sells a list with customer names that will be used for direct marketing 
purposes, the customer’s name is not used to promote any product, the reputation and image of 
this customer in no way brings any benefit to the data collector. 
 
And lastly, the tort of false light has no applicability for personal data related issues. The 
information concerned in this tort must be erroneous. Such a remedy is not suitable as a measure 
of granting greater control to the data subject over his data. In this case, the action is illegal if 
information puts the complainant in an unfavorable, bad light. Such a remedy cannot be used 
in cases where the plaintiff himself has provided his data to the controller. Illegal data 
processing, excessive data collection does not necessarily affect subject's right to protect his 
reputation. The false light tort is not applicable also in cases of further unauthorized transfer of 
personal data. 
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Thus, after considering the American system of a tort, it becomes apparent that the system of 
existing tort in the United States is not able to provide effective protection of the rights of 
individuals to privacy and to protect personal data in particular against unfair information 
practices. The courts do not provide coherent decisions on privacy matters.97 American system 
of torts provides protection only against the disclosure of personal data  that is highly offensive 
for the data subject or when the action of data collection is intrusive itself.98 
 
Even if the courts start interpreting some of the concepts more widely, tort alone as a remedy 
against private information misuse will not be enough. A tort system cannot provide 
comprehensive protection because it is aimed at establishing justice after someone’s right has 
been violated, torts eliminate the consequences of the offense, but do not prevent illegal actions. 
It is the substantive law norms that are intended to establish the rights and positive obligations 
of the parties of the legal relationship. 
 
And, of course, it is worth mentioning once again that the court, while assessing the alleged 
violation of the right to informational privacy is guided by very vague (reasonable expectation 
of confidentiality) and outdated (privacy as secrecy) criteria. The court must evaluate all the 
circumstances of the case to decide on the fact of a violation. If data subjects can protect their 
rights to information privacy only through litigation. This can lead to very negative 
consequences when, due to the significant cost of time and money, individuals will not be 
encouraged to seek the protection of their rights.99 
4.4 US Constitution 
 
Considering the limitations of the US legal system, Constitutional law also must be mentioned. 
First of all, even though the Constitution has a special role in information privacy development, 
the limited scope of constitutional protection has to be noted. The Constitution is purposed to 
establish limitations on the state’s power constraining government from certain actions.100 
Moreover, constitutional provisions do not create positive obligations, but rather imposes 
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negative duties not to invade the privacy of citizens without absolute necessity.101 Also, the 
Constitution does not regulate relations between private parties.102 
 
However, it is reasonable to affirm that with existing global private entities such as Google, 
Facebook, and entities which provide essential services, the data subject is fairly in the same 
position as with the government.103 Nevertheless, the relations between private parties 
regardless of the actual non-equal footing are of utilitarian nature104 and almost entirely left to 
self-regulation. And in most cases, data subjects are bound by terms and conditions imposed by 
a powerful party.105   
 
The Fifth Amendment, which states that no one can be forced to disclose incriminating 
information in the framework of criminal proceedings. Thus, the Amendment restricts the 
state’s power in collecting information about its citizens. The Amendment has a very limited 
application exclusively in the framework of criminal prosecution, and the provisions are also 
addressed specifically to the state but not to private parties.106 
 
The Fourth Amendment is designed to protect citizens against “unreasonable searches and 
seizures”. Some authors believe that the Fourth Amendment is the American approach to 
defining the concept of privacy.107 But the courts interpreting the Fourth Amendment severely 
limit its application. The courts are guided by an approach to privacy as an area of life that is 
expected to be confidential. Such an approach is vague, the expectation of privacy will 
inevitably differ from person to person depending on person’s social-economic background.108 
 
To  sum up, the above-mentioned shortcomings have forced the US scholars to reconsider the 
privacy concept supporting the model of control which means that individuals should be granted 
the right to decide on who, when, and for what purposes can get access to and make use of their 
personal information. In that sense, privacy, specifically informational privacy, in fact, can be 
defined as the property right on personal data. That would mean that the data subject is entitled 
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to exclude others from accessing his personal information and to determine conditions and 
terms under which such information can be communicated to others.109 
4.5 Code of Fair Information Practices 
 
An overview of the American legal system on data protection matters would be incomplete 
without the Code of Fair Information Practices. The US Department of Health, Education, and 
Welfare proposed to create a new regulation that could meet the requirements of the era of new 
technologies and the problems created by their global application. It outlined the problem 
caused by the rapid development of information technology and set the task of developing a 
new regulation that could protect the information privacy of citizens.110 
 
As a general guideline for the creation of appropriate regulation, the basic principles were 
drafted, which were to form the framework for the new law. Five principles were highlighted: 
1. the prohibition of secret collection and storage of personal data; 2. the right of the data subject 
to know what information and for what purposes it is processed; 3. the right of the personal data 
subject to prevent the processing of data for purposes other than established for the initial 
collection of data; 4. the right of the data subject to rectify inaccurate information about self; 5. 
the data controller should be held responsible for the misuse of the collected personal data. 
 
Further in this work, it will be shown that this had a great influence on the construction of the 
European approach to the protection of personal data, and these principles were also included 
in the supranational EU acts that consolidate the criteria for the lawful processing of personal 
data. 
 
The Code of Fair Information Practices was intended to solve the problem of the imbalance of 
power between data subjects and data controllers111 by concentrating control over personal data 
in the hands of the subjects and making the controllers accountable for personal data misuse. 
 
Although this act had a big potential in the shaping of effective protection of personal data, its 
provisions did not have a direct effect, but rather were of a recommendatory nature and had to 
be implemented. However, private organizations were not interested in securing high standards 
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of personal data protection, which could be burdensome and impede the normal operation of 
these organizations.112 As a result, relations concerning personal data protection is left to self-
regulation by private organizations, except for those organizations that handle special category 
of sensitive information.113 
4.6 Propertisation as a tool to fill the gaps 
 
The shortcomings of the tort system and existing laws, which were influenced by the impact of 
lobbying corporations, became the prerequisites for the emergence of discussions on expanding 
property rights to personal data. Such an approach was supposed to solve several concerns at 
once, to strengthen the position of the data subject by concentrating control over personal data 
in their hands, and also to create the incentives for controllers to take organizational, 
technological measures aimed at ensuring the security of personal data and their fair use. 
 
This section will focus on the arguments of privacy proponents who advocate for vesting 
property right in personal data with the data subject. Aware of the indispensable role of personal 
data for personal freedom,114 advocates of the proportization approach emphasize the need for 
default provisions that would outline reasonable limits for the freedom to exercise property 
right on personal data. These provisions would be designed to protect the interests of the data 
subjects as a weaker and less competent party. 
 
Cohen115 has consistently emphasized the importance of discussions about property rights to 
personal data, since this would, to a certain extent, contribute to educating people to value their 
personal data and to be more conscious and responsible in matters of its disposal. Some authors 
believe that control over the dissemination of personal data is possible through partial property 
rights to personal data.116 
 
Vera Bergelson argues that the choice between the protection of personal data through tort or 
property rights is identical to the choice between the proprietary regime and the liability 
regime.117 These regimes are not interchangeable, and each of them pursues different goals, one 
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of them is aimed at preventing violations, and the other at restoring justice after a violation has 
taken place. And liability rules cannot achieve the goal of concentrating control over personal 
data in the hands of the data subject. 
 
Likewise, Murphy does not rely on proportional accounting of interests when resolving related 
disputes by the courts. The American legal order has very detailed regulation of the right to 
freedom of expression (The First Amendment). By opposing the interests of the press and 
freedom of expression against the vague notion of privacy, of course, the former will always 
prevail.118 
 
Unlike the tort system, property rights allow taking into account the preferences of the data 
subject, what information he considers private, to whom, and for what purposes he wants to 
disclose his personal information. The courts try to operate with the objective concept of a 
reasonable expectation of privacy, which does not play a favorable role in defending the 
interests of the data subject.119 
 
Moreover, self-regulation by companies of their activities and, in particular, activities related to 
the use of personal data, does not contribute in any way to the creation of an initiative to develop 
and invest in PETs (privacy enhancing technologies).120 
 
And finally, the advantage of the approach of extending property rules to personal data will 
bypass the need for the adoption of special regulation by the legislative system, which is 
influenced by the interests of private corporations. 
4.7 Criticism of the propertisation arguments 
 
The purpose of the data propertization is empowering those to whom personal information 
pertains and giving them control over their information but the theory of personal data 
propertization within the US context is supposed to tackle the problem of power imbalance. 
Vesting property right in personal data is expected to encourage entities who collect and use 
data to create privacy- enhancing technologies. Nowadays companies freely make use of 
personal data, there is no incentive for them to take into account the interests of individuals. 
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The introduction of data propertiztion would force companies to change their strategy, focus on 
developing more appealing privacy terms, better technological solutions for consumers’ data 
protection. 
 
Property right over personal data can indeed serve as a tool for data subjects to exercise control 
over personal information. However, the discussion about the proportization approach in 
doctrine has always been accompanied by criticism. The main argument calling into question 
the effectiveness of this mechanism is dispute about the alienation of the right to personal data. 
 
Some authors believe that the default rules restricting the right to alienate personal data are not 
in line with the concept of control. Therefore, data subjects should have the right to dispose of 
their personal data at their own discretion, including in cases of intent to monetize their personal 
information.121 
 
While proponents of complete personal data commodification support the wide scope of the 
property right, privacy advocates emphasize the necessity for certain default rules and 
restrictions which would serve for non-market, namely, privacy protection purposes.122 
 
Schwartz believes that it will be impossible to achieve privacy goals without fixing the default 
rules. He explains this by the fact that, firstly, information privacy is also a public good, and the 
market fails in adequately assessing this value, therefore, protection of this value is impossible 
without additional interference in the regulation.123 Thus, Paul Schwartz proposed to introduce 
such a model of property right which would limit alienability of personal data and default rules 
that would block the further use or transfer of personal data without the consent of the data 
subject.124 Such a property right model is aimed to take into account the social value of privacy 
and privacy interests of data subjects instead of the goal of facilitating the information 
market.125 
 
If the data subject was granted the right to conclude agreements with controllers for the 
alienation of their personal  data, he would not be able to defend his interests against huge 
powerful corporations due to insufficient expertise in personal data concerns. It will not be 
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difficult for such companies to coerce the data subject to agree to their terms of transfer of 
personal data. 
 
However, as it was pointed out by Jessica Litman, property right is intended to encourage the 
free and unhindered transfer of goods from one person to another. Therefore, the deprivation of 
the subjects of the property right to alienate their property seriously distorts this goal.126 
 
As noted above, the judicial and legislative system in the US transparently recognizes the value 
of personal data. Notwithstanding, vesting property right in personal data there is a risk that the 
court takes into account only the economic value of property, while ignoring the fact that 
property right also encompasses the non-economic relationship between the subject and his 
property. Regarding personal information, one must recognize that information about an 
individual is an integral part of his or her personality and integrity. Recognizing the control of 
the data subject over his personal information, individuals are able to decide on the way the 
information about them is used, which is essential in any democratic society.127 That concern is 
reflected in Pamela's rather straightforward statement that the idea of endowing individuals with  
a property right in their fundamental rights is morally unacceptable.128 
4.8 Conclusion 
 
The need for a new approach to protecting information privacy, and in particular the protection 
of personal data, arose against the background of the inefficiency of existing mechanisms and 
tools in the American legal system. The problems start with the lack of a unified concept of 
privacy, which creates uncertainty for both individuals, private enterprises, and law 
enforcement agencies. 
 
The USA, being a country with a common legal system, does not have a unified and 
comprehensive legal act that would provide at least a framework for the regulation of 
information privacy across the country. The system for regulating personal data protection is 
extremely fragmented. The tort system also does not provide adequate protection of the right to 
privacy. Each of the available torts has a limited application that cannot serve as a universal 
instrument. 
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The introduction of property right over personal data is supposed to solve the problem of the 
lack of control of data subjects over personal data pertaining to them, as well as correcting the 
imbalance of power between controllers and data subjects. Nevertheless, many supporters of 
the theory of personal data proportization justify the need for default rules that would restrict 
the freedom of data subject to transfer ownership to the controller. Otherwise, it would be 
impossible to ensure and achieve the goals that follow the approach of personal data 
proprtization as an effective tool of protection. 
 
In the context of the American legal system, the introduction of property rights (even with 
restrictions, some may call it quasi-property) will help to find a more fair balance in power 
distribution, this will help to avoid the procedure for adopting federal law, since this procedure 
is very undesirable due to the dependence of the legislating decisions and process on interests 
of lobbying companies. 
 
Even though the approach of proportization of personal data has the potential to fill significant 
gaps in the American legal system, this theory is also subject to serious criticism. The problem 
is not that data subjects cannot exercise control over their personal data. The main problem of 
information privacy is that misuse of personal data is carried out in ignorance of the data subject. 
Businesses do not consider the need to comply with their own privacy conditions, which they 
so eloquently promise to fulfill. Therefore, the central issue that needs immediate resolution is 















5 Chapter 5: The EU Data Protection Regulation 
 
Over the years, with the rapid development of the information economy, a significant imbalance 
between data subject and controllers has been escalating. Data subjects submit more and more 
personal information, including a special category of sensitive data. Moreover, new 
technological tools have also appeared that make the process of classification, profiling, sorting, 
selection, collection, processing of personal data a easier and relatively cheaper.129 
 
The threat of invasion of privacy is now presented not only from the public, state bodies but 
from private enterprises and the natural persons.130 Access to personal information of almost 
any person in current digital era has become commonplace, a matter of a couple of clicks. The 
ability of some organizations to easily collect a ton of information about users poses a serious 
threat to the protection of privacy from intrusion by private parties. When searching for some 
information about someone, the search engine will most likely provide with other information 
that has not been even sought. 
 
It is for these reasons that the interference of the law in the regulation of the personal data 
protection of data subjects is increasingly relevant and vital at present. 
 
The European legal system differs from the American legal order in that it highly values the 
right of everyone to respect for private life, including right to personal data proetction which 
are enshrined in the Constitution of the Member States, and this right is also enshrined as a 
fundamental right in supranational legal acts131. 
5.1 Data protection as a dimension of privacy 
 
In the legal literature, two dominant concepts of determining the place and meaning of the right 
to personal data protection can be distinguished. According to the concept that guides the 
American legal system and legislators, the right to personal data protection is one of several 
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tools that ensure the right of people to privacy. A different concept, which is applied in the EU 
legal order, gives the right to personal data protection the status of a fundamental right that 
exists independently along with the right to privacy.132 
 
Nevertheless, the right to privacy and the right to personal data protection often overlap. 
Moreover, both international and national courts tend to interpret the concept of the right to 
privacy in a much wider manner that might even comprise the right to data protection. In 
different contexts, under different circumstances and time, the content of the right to privacy 
can be defined in different ways to meet the new challenges imposed by steady progress in 
society.133 
 
In the broadest sense, the right to privacy is not so much about the right to keep private life 
secret, but rather about freedom. The right to privacy gives confidence that individuals are 
entitled to publicly express their beliefs and views without fear of negative consequences. The 
right to privacy enables individual to determine his own behavior,  personality without 
interference and control by the state or other third parties.134 Such blurred boundaries of the 
right to privacy cannot provide clear regulation for relationships related to the collection and 
processing of personal data.135 In the European legal context, the right to privacy is alike 
freedom, it is difficult to determine the scope of such freedom since a strict and rigid definition 
of this right can lead to negative consequences. It seems impossible to foresee all potential 
misconduct that could infringe the right to privacy. This flexible approach to the definition of 
the right to privacy allows it to meet the needs of a continuously developing society. However, 
vague definition of the concept also creates legal uncertainty.136 
 
Another important point is that the right to privacy obliges the state not to interfere with the 
freedom of private life of citizens. The right to the protection of personal data has a different 
essence. If the right to privacy implies a passive obligation not to invade a person's private life 
(in other words, this is a negative right), then the right to personal data protection guarantees a 
number of rights to the data subject and imposes active obligations of data controllers.137Thus, 
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the right to personal data protection is a positive right and brings more certainty for both 
parties.138 
5.2 Right to data protection as a fundamental right. Article 8 of the European 
Union Charter of Fundamental Rights 
 
Despite the fact that the European courts are doing a successful job in interpreting the right to 
privacy quite broadly, the development of society constantly requires the solution of new 
problems that were not taken into account at the time of the adoption of a particular statute. 
However, since modern technology poses a serious threat to the integrity and independence of 
the individual, the new fundamental right to personal data protection was enshrined in CFR 
(Charter of Fundamental Rights of the European Union). The Charter for the first time delimited 
two fundamental rights, having reserved the right to privacy (Article 7) and the right to personal 
data protection (Article 8) in separate articles. If Article 7 has the same wording as in the Human 
Rights Convention, then the article on the right to the protection of personal data reads as 
follow:139 
 
1.Everyone has the right to the protection of personal data concerning him 
or her. 
2.Such data must be processed fairly for specified purposes and on the basis 
of the consent of the person concerned or some other legitimate basis laid 
down by law. Everyone has the right of access to data that has been collected 
concerning him or her, and the right to have it rectified. 
3.Compliance with these rules shall be subject to control by an independent 
authority. 
 
This provision is a framework provision for the further detailed regulation of the protection of 
personal data and enshrines the fundamental principles that should permeate all regulation 
related to personal data processing practices. 
 
And as it was noted earlier, the right to privacy and the right to personal data protection is of a 
different nature. The right to privacy imposes a negative obligation on everyone not to take any 
action that may invade a person's privacy. At the same time, the right to the protection of 
                                                 
138Hildebrandt 2015, pg. 190 
139Rodota 2009, pg. 79 
44 
 
personal data empowers data subjects and imposes positive obligations on other actors, in 
particular on controllers, who must take certain measures to ensure effective protection of 
personal data and interests of the data subject.140 
 
As was fairly noted by Stefano Rodota, while recognizing the right to personal data protection 
as a fundamental right, legislators and law enforcement authorities should adopt additional 
safeguards aimed at protecting one’s personality. The law should not perceive the data subject 
as the owner of personal information but should take care of protecting the person himself and 
his integrity and freedom.141 
 
The first tool that was developed to solve the problem of personal data protection, entered into 
force in 1981. It was Convention on the protection of automatically processed personal data 
drafted by the Council of Europe. These provisions had to be ratified by the Member States, 
however, not all countries eventually adopted it in their national laws. Nevertheless, these 
provisions were the legal source of regulation of personal data processing processes in all EU 
countries.142 
 
The rapid development of digital technology relentlessly set new challenges for the protection 
of personal data, at some point it was assumed that the existing protection tool had become 
outdated and ineffective for the task at hand. Given these circumstances, the development of a 
new protection tool began in 1991. In 1995 the Data Protection Directive entered into force 
drafted by the European Parliament and the Council.143 
 
The Directive did not have a direct effect on the Member States, it had a recommendatory and 
guiding character. The Directive aimed was to ensure a high level of protection of personal data 
(it attempted to reunite the best traditions and solutions of regulating the protection of personal 
data of those countries that are distinguished by high data protection standards), as well as the 
Directive called on countries to harmonize the regulation144 across the EU. That is, the Directive 
had a dual purpose, to ensure the efficient functioning of the market and the flow of data 
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between countries, as well as to establish a high level of protection of personal data of data 
subjects in all Member States.145 
 
Even though the former Directive to some point resolved the issue of fragmented regulation of 
matters related to the protection of personal data in the EU, it still failed to effectively regulate 
the processing of personal data of EU citizens outside the EU. So, if the personal data of EU 
citizens was processed in non-EU countries using equipment not located in the EU, then EU 
laws did not apply to the operations of processing personal data, even if this data concerns its 
own citizens.146 
5.3 General data protection policy within the EU: the goals 
 
The central objectives at that time of the already 20-year-old Data Protection Directive were to 
ensure the smooth functioning of the internal market and the free flow of data between the 
Member States, as well as the effective protection and establishment of a high level of  personal 
data protection across all EU countries.147 The subsequent regulation of personal data protection 
concerning collection and processing came into force in 2016 but started its application in 2018. 
The new General Data Protection Regulation aimed to strengthen the rights of data subjects and 
providing better harmonization.148 
 
The new Regulation mainly borrowed key concepts, principles, and ideas from the previous 
document.149 However, the essential and main distinguishing feature is that the Regulation can 
be applied by national authorities directly, and all private patties also bounded by its provisions, 
it does not need to be implemented in national laws. 
 
Such direct application achieves the goal of ensuring the smooth functioning of the market and 
protecting personal data, making sure that from the moment it is applied, harmonization will be 
ensured in establishing a high level of protection of the right to personal data. 
 
Another important advantage of the Regulation and another step towards ensuring effective 
protection of personal data of data subjects is the change in the provision on the territorial scope 
                                                 
145Savin 2017, pg. 270 
146Savin 2017, pg. 272 
147Savin 2017, pg. 275 
148Savin 2017, pg. 282 
149Savin 2017, pg. 283 
46 
 
of the Regulation which was the significant flaw of the Directive 1995. Thus, according to 
Article 3, the Regulation is applicable when controllers or processors are established in the EU, 
even if the processing takes place outside the Union, and also in cases when the personal 
information of EU citizens is subject to processing for marketing purposes or behavioral 
monitoring.150 
 
It can be observed that the objectives of the previous and current regulation are mostly the same. 
However, the new General Data Protection Regulation takes serious steps in empowering the 
data subject and retaining the control over their data. This is evidenced by a number of 
innovations, namely new rights of data subjects and rules of controllers’ and processors 
accountability, that are enshrined in the provisions of the concerned regulation. 
 
The consent mechanism which was already used before the Regulation has undergone fewer 
changes. The new Regulation solidified the accountability of the controller151, therefore it is the 
controller's responsibility to obtain the informed consent from the data subject. The burden of 
proof of validity of the consent accordingly lies with the controller. 
 
One of the innovations presented in the new regulation is the child's consent152 to the offered 
informational social services. Thus, the processing of personal data will be legal if the child has 
reached the age of 16 (national laws may reduce this age to 13, but not younger). If the child is 
younger than the specified age, the controller must ensure that consent to the processing of 
personal data can be obtained from the person holding parental rights for the child. 
 
The category of sensitive information is not a new discovery of the Regulation, however, this 
category has been expanded, and now includes, along with others, genetic and biometric data, 
as well as information regarding the sexual orientation of the data subject.153 
 
The principle of purpose-binding data processing has been further regulated in more details, 
namely, the controller's obligation to obtain consent separately for each new purpose of data 
processing. If, however, the controller processes the personal data of the data subject for a 
purpose other than the original purpose, then the burden of proving the compatibility of the 
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processing with initial purpose lies with the controller, who must take into account a number of 
circumstances listed in Article 6 (4). 
 
In pursuance of the Regulation’s aim to strengthen the rights of data subjects, the Regulation 
has created a number of new rights. One of these is the right to be forgotten, enshrined in Article 
17 with a succession of the court's position in the Google Spain154 case regarding the role and 
responsibility of search engines.155To exercise the right to erasure, the data subject must base 
his decision on one of the following six grounds listed in the Article 17: personal data is no 
longer necessary for the collection and processing; the exercise of the right to withdraw consent 
to data processing when such processing has been carried out based on consent; the exercise of 
the right to object when there is no overriding public interest or interest of the controller, and in 
any case if the processing was carried out for marketing purposes; the data processing has been 
unlawfully processed; the controller's obligation to erase personal data established by the 
Member Country; in case of collection and processing of personal data of children under the 
age specified in Article 8 (1). 
 
Another new right granted to data subjects is the right to restrict processing.156 This right is 
valuable because it limits the possibilities for data processing, during the period of checking the 
grounds for the data subject's claim when he asserts the inaccuracy of personal data, as well as 
in the event of objecting the processing of personal data. Two other conditions for the exercise 
of the right to restriction of processing, when, in the event of the unlawfulness of data 
processing, the data subject requires the restriction of processing instead of erasing the data. 
The right is also relevant where personal data are no longer needed for the purposes of their 
collection and processing, but they are necessary for the data subject for legal purposes. 
 
A completely new right of data subjects is the right enshrined in Article 20 under the title ‘Right 
to data portability’ which is applicable where the processing of data has been carried out based 
on the consent of the data subject and by automatic means. According to this provision, the data 
subject has the right to receive or demand from the controller the unhindered transfer of his 
personal data to another controller ‘in a structured, commonly used and machine-readable 
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format’.157 The right to data portability is also expected to contribute to increasing the 
interoperability in the Union.158 
 
In addition to creating new rights aimed at strengthening the position and control of the data 
subjects, the Regulation also enshrines additional guarantees for the protection of data subjects 
against profiling and decisions made exclusively on automatic processing.159 The Regulation 
gives the definition of the mentions types of data processing. 
 
And finally, in Article 25 a new concept is enshrined, which should permeate all the activities 
of controllers. According to the Article, the data controllers and processors must ensure data 
protection by design and by default. The protection of personal data on design requires the 
controllers and processors to take appropriate technical and organizational measures to ensure 
adequate protection of personal data. These measures should be taken in compliance with the 
substantial principles of the Regulation. And the default protection concept means that the 
controller collects and processes the minimum amount of data that is fundamentally necessary 
for the purpose of such processing (principle of data minimization).160 
5.4 Principles of the General Data Protection Regulation 
 
However, the primary source of principles for the regulation of issues related to the lawful 
collection and processing of data are enshrined in the CFR, in the article devoted to the 
fundamental right to the protection of personal data in Article 8. Since the adoption of this 
article, the European legal order has followed a fundamental approach to the right to the 
protection of personal data. Denoting the same principles, the new regulation also pays extra 
attention to the matters of accountability and security breach notification.161 
 
These principles are reflected in each provision of the Regulation, and Article contains  
principles related to the processing of personal data in the form of a list of seven principles that 
must be applied and followed in any personal data use practice by any controller and processor. 
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5.4.1 Lawfulness, fairness, and transparency 
 
The first in the list of principles for processing personal data is the principle of legal, 
transparent, and fair data processing. This principle is the most general and is reflected in all 
other principles.162Each of the three components of this principle has a distinct meaning.163 
 
For the processing to be lawful, it must be based on one of the grounds enshrined in Article 6 
(1) of the Regulation. Also, when processing a special category of personal information, the 
controller must be guided by Article 9, which establishes a special regulation justified by the 
vulnerability of sensitive information. Nevertheless, the Regulation empowers the Member 
States with some degree of flexibility to develop more detailed regulation on the grounds for 
the processing, in particular when the processing is carried out in compliance with the 
controller's legal obligations (Article 6 (1c)), and when the processing is necessary for the 
public interest (Article 6 (1e)). Thus, the lawfulness of the processing is determined by 
compliance with the requirements and conditions established by Union law and the national law 
of the Member States. 
 
For the processing of data to be considered fair and transparent, the controller is responsible to 
properly inform the data subject about what information is necessary for processing, the purpose 
of processing, the rights of the data subject, information about the controller, about the 
recipients of personal data, the period of storage, about the source of information, when the data 
is not provided by the data subject, about the additional safeguards when transferring data to a 
third country. The data subject must be aware of the profiling and automated decision-making, 
the logic behind it, and the consequences such processing might entail.164 The information 
related to the data processing should be provided by thecontroller in an accessible and easy to 
understand form. 
5.4.2 Purpose limitations 
 
The principle of purpose limitation establishes a requirement that any personal information 
must be ‘collected for specified, explicit and legitimate purposes and not further processed in 
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a manner that is incompatible with those purposes’165. The principle significantly limits the 
freedom of controllers, requiring them to clearly define what data and for what purposes the 
collection and processing of personal data is necessary and obliges them to unambiguously 
inform the subject of personal data.166 For any new purpose for data collection and processing, 
the controller must obtain the new consent of the personal data subject separate from the 
previously obtained consent or comply with other grounds for processing.167 The principle 
prevents abuse by the controller, where the controller defines a highly fluid purpose in an 
attempt to justify further use of the data by that vague purpose. 
 
If the controller has legitimate grounds for storing personal data after the purpose of their 
collection and the purpose of processing has been achieved, the controller has no right in the 
future to process data for purposes incompatible with the original purposes.168 And as was stated 
earlier, the burden of proof of compatibility lies with the controller. 
 
Thus, from the principle, three obvious requirements for the controller can be derived. Firstly, 
the controller is obliged to properly inform the data subject about the category of information 
and the purposes of their processing. Second, each new processing purpose requires a separate 
legal basis. And finally, the goal set by the controller must be legitimate.169 
5.4.3 Data minimization 
 
In addition to the fact that the legislator makes the controllers and processors of personal data 
responsible for the data collection and processing following a strictly formulated purpose, but 
also prohibits the collection of that information that is not necessary for the fulfillment of the 
purpose determined by the controller.170 Thus, it is possible to trace a logical correlation with 
the principle of purpose limitation.171 
 
Under the data minimization principle, the controller is obliged to collect the minimum 
necessary information that will be sufficient to fulfill the goal of processing to avoid wasteful 
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data processing.172 The collection of an excessive amount of personal data that is objectively 
not needed for the claimed purpose is  not in line with the principle of data minimization. 
5.4.4 Accuracy 
 
The principle of accuracy sets the requirement that personal data be ‘accurate and, where 
necessary, kept up to date’173. This principle gives rise to the rights of the data subject to request 
that inaccurate information to be erased174 or rectified175. The principle itself, in its wording, 
establishes the controller's obligations, correlating with the rights of the data subject, to take 
active measures to timely remove inaccurate information or correct it. 
 
This principle is intended to ensure the quality of the array of personal information that is 
collected by numerous controllers for various purposes. 
5.4.5 Storage limitation 
 
The storage limitation principle obliges the controller not to store personal data of subjects when 
this information is no longer needed. That is, the personal data provided by the data subject or 
other authorized person has a limited storage period, there is no concept of indefinite storage of 
data in the databases of the controllers. Although the provisions of the Regulation provide for 
some exceptions when information can be stored for a longer period for public, scientific or 
historical research purposes, and statistical purposes, and where it is possible, such information 
should be pseudonymized176. If the controller has grounds for longer storage of personal data, 
then he must ensure that he can provide sufficient technical and organizational measures for 
safe storage. 
 
For the purposes mentioned, Article 89 (2) allows for some derogations from other provisions 
of the Regulation. The data subject cannot exercise his rights to access his data (Article 15), 
demand rectification of personal data (Article 16), the right to restrict processing (Article 18), 
and the right to object (Article 21), as otherwise would significantly interfere fulfilling the 
objectives exhaustively listed in Article 89 (1). 
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5.4.6 Data integrity and confidentiality 
 
The principle of integrity and confidentiality imposes an obligation on the controller177 to take 
sufficient and effective measures to ensure the security of personal data. The principle is aimed 
at preventing cases of unauthorized data processing, its loss, or other damage to personal data. 
To effectively implement this principle, the Regulation introduces such a concept as protection 
by default and by design178, which states that the controller is obliged to take the necessary 
technical and organizational measures to secure personal data. Appropriate measures should not 
be applied after the collection of data, but be already incorporated prior to any operations 
concerning personal data.179 This position of the Union is consistent, the discussion of the so-
called PETs (Privacy Enhancing Technologies)180 that has been going on for a long time. 
 
In cases where the processing of personal data is carried out based on a contract by another 
party - a processor - the controller must take precautions and make sure that the processor can 
ensure the proper level of security of personal data, and that the processor takes the necessary 
technical and organizational measures to comply with the principle of integrity and 
confidentiality personal data.181 If the processor is unreliable, the controller is also responsible 
for the processor's actions. 
5.4.7 Accountability 
 
Generally speaking, the principle of accountability boils down to the fact that the responsibility 
for complying with the provisions of the protection of personal data almost always rests with 
the controller.182 Moreover, every right of the data subject, enshrined in the Regulation, is 
supported by a correlating obligation of the controller. The right to erasure, rectification, or 
processing restriction is backed-up by the controller's notification obligation.183 
 
Competent regulation of the protection of personal data imposes the obligation to determine the 
purpose and means of collecting and processing personal data on the data collectors. That is 
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why the legislator makes the controller accountable for compliance with the necessary measures 
to ensure a high level of protection of personal data and compliance with data protection 
principles.184 In such circumstances, when the personal data collector himself has determined 
the scope of the purposes of data processing, he is best aware of the scope of his freedom of 
action and responsibility for violation of the established limits of data processing.185 
 
For instance, since the controller himself decides on the means of personal data processing, he 
bears the onus to ensure that the processor applies the necessary technical and organizational 
measures to ensure the security of personal data. 
 
Another example, the Regulation does not relieve the controller from the responsibility to 
comply with the principles of personal data protection regulation, even if the data subject has 
provided his informed, free, and unambiguous consent to the collection and processing of his 
data.186 That is, even if the subject of personal data gives his consent to the collection of an 
excessive amount of his personal data for  the purpose determined by the controller, the 
controller is still accountable for the obligation to collect and process only the amount of 
personal data that is necessary to achieve the purpose of data collection. The collection of 
excessive personal information is considered arbitrary and contrary to the principle of data 
minimization, even if such collection was authorized by the data subject himself. 
5.5 Shortcomings of available implementation mechanisms 
 
After getting acquainted with the history of personal data protection in the EU, and describing, 
and explaining the principles and key provisions of the General Data Protection Regulation, it 
is possible at that point to draw, among other things, some conclusions about the shortcomings 
of the Regulation. The central question here is whether the Regulation has achieved the goals it 
was intended to achieve and how effective its provisions are in ensuring the fundamental right 
to the protection of personal data. 
 
The GDPR began its implementation only in 2018, that is, relatively very recently.  
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Nevertheless, the Commission has already managed to issue a report187 on the experience of 
applying the Regulation over the past two years. 
 
The Commission itself notes a number of advantages of the GDPR, in particular, strengthening 
the position of the data subject and vesting with new right with the data subjects, stronger 
safeguards especially when transferring data to non-EU countries, greater transparency of 
operations with personal data, increased accountability of those who handle data, significant 
steps towards further harmonization and thereby ensuring the successful functioning of the 
internal market.188 
 
The deficiencies noted by the Commission mainly relate to problems of the enforcement, as 
well as harmonization and cooperation of data protection authorities.189 
 
Achieving harmonized regulation across 28 countries is an extremely difficult task. Usually, the 
legal framework enshrines broad concepts and principles and provides national legislators with 
a certain degree of discretion in the implementation of the supranational framework 
regulation.190 The Data Protection Directive was advisory in nature, but the GDPR has a direct 
effect in the Member States. However, the task of full harmonization has not been achieved at 
the moment, and significant discrepancies in national laws can be observed. 
 
The problem with the lack of cooperation between the authorities of the Member States is 
essential in achieving the objectives of the smooth functioning of the single market. The 
Commission denotes that additional initiatives are needed to improve the procedure for 
resolving cross-border complaints.191 
 
However, the problem of harmonization does not end with a lack of cooperation between 
authorities, but also with the fragmentation of national regulation of the Member States. Almost 
all Member States have developed a national law regulating the protection of personal data. 
Although the Regulation itself has given some margin of appreciation to the Member States, 
such fragmentation hinders the smooth operation of the single market. As an example, the 
Commission cites the situation with the age of the child, when the child has the right to consent 
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to the processing of his personal data. Some countries have opted for a minimum age of 13, 
creating legal uncertainty that makes it difficult for data subjects and controllers to understand 
and comply with the rules. Also, although the logic of the GDPR is to establish a single standard 
for the protection of personal data, with the empowerment of the Member States, at their own 
discretion, to enshrine in their legislation higher protection of personal data, the Commission 
recognizes that additional requirements can put unduly burden on the  companies.192 
 
Different approaches were taken by the Member States also regarding the regulation of 
derogations from a special regime of sensitive data processing for health and research 
purposes.193 
 
Another disadvantage of the Regulation is the silence about the achievement of a balance 
between two values, namely the right to freedom of expression and the right to personal data 
protection. Thus, national legislators have taken different approaches to resolving this matter. 
In some national legal systems, the right to personal data protection prevails, while in others 
the prerogative is given to the right to freedom of expression.194 
 
Further, although the Commission notes a positive trend in the awareness of data subjects about 
existing data protection laws and their rights regarding personal data pertaining to them, data 
subjects do not fully use all available mechanisms of strengthening control that are provided to 
them by the Regulation, for instance, right to data portability is barely exercised by the data 
subjects.195 
 
Positive for data subjects on the one hand, and unduly burdensome on the other, is the principle 
of accountability and related provisions. As mentioned earlier in this chapter, the subject of 
almost all obligations implemented in the Regulation is the controller of personal data. It should 
be noted that this approach of the legislator has become burdensome for small and medium-
sized enterprises. Although the Commission believes that healthy competition is maintained in 
this way, various guides on less risky activities have been issued specifically to help SMEs, 
such as different templates, consultation lines, and the like.196 
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The mechanism of free and informed consent is still a controversial tool for strengthening the 
control of data subjects over personal data. The doubts expressed by jurists ten years ago are 
still relevant today. The concerns mainly boil down to the use by controllers of complex and 
incomprehensible wording in a request for consent, which contains fundamentally important 
information regarding the processing of personal data. As a result, data subjects do not even 
make an effort to get to know what data, for what purposes, how and by which means it will be 
processed.197 
 
Also, there are ubiquitous cases of data subjects' dependence on controllers, for example in 
labor relations. However, employers actively use this basis for data processing, leaving no 
choice for data subjects. Such consent is obtained with coercion; therefore, it is contrary to the 
provisions of the Regulation. And it is in such situations that it is very unlikely that the data 
subject will exercise his rights to request the erasure of data or seek legal assistance from the 
relevant authorities due to possible adverse consequences in the workplace. 
5.6 Conclusion 
 
The main document regulating the processing of personal data in the EU is General Data 
Protection Regulation, which started its application in 2018. The new Regulation inherited the 
objectives of its predecessor, the Directive 1995, namely, to empower the position of data 
subjects and achieve harmonized the regulation of lawful data processing. 
 
The 1995 Directive had many shortcomings, chief among them was the recommendatory nature 
of the document, which was subject to ratification by the Member States. Also, the previous 
regulation enshrined very weak rules of accountability of controllers considering complexity of 
data processing operations, the principle of purpose limitation was not detailed enough. The 
shortcomings of the previous regulation could not ensure adequate protection of the interests of 
data subjects. Data subjects were prevented from exercising meaningful control over personal 
data. 
 
The new Regulation also has its drawbacks. There is still a need to take additional measures to 
achieve harmonization, which is of particular importance for the enforcement of the data 
processing rules and cooperation of the data protection authorities. 
                                                 




Moreover, despite the valuable tools for exercising control by data subjects, these tools are not 
yet used to their full extent, therefore it is of great importance to inform and educate data 
subjects about their rights concerning personal data pertaining to them. 
 
The new Regulation transparently follows a fundamental approach to the protection of personal 
data, ensuring that the position of data subjects is strengthened with innovative rights that were 
not enshrined in previous Union acts. The principles contained in the Regulation are of great 
practical importance, since they limit the freedom of controllers in the processing of personal 
data and their storage, restricting their freedom by the principle of data minimization and the 
purpose limitation. Also, a lot of attention in the Regulation is paid to the responsibility and 
accountability rules of controllers and processors. 
 
The GDPR is a promising tool in ensuring a high level of protection of personal data, as well 






















6 Chapter 6: The possibility of vesting property right in personal data 
in the EU legal order 
 
The provisions of the GDPR do not directly impede the implementation of proprietary rights in 
personal data, but also it does not contain any provisions that would explicitly indicate that this 
approach is followed or accepted. Moreover, the GDPR does not dispose of proprietary 
terminology, the data subject is not denoted as the owner, and the personal data is not identified 
as property.198 
 
Some authors claim that the European legislator has enshrined control mechanisms in its law 
that are akin to the nature of property rights.199 However, the fact that the Regulation sets as 
one of its goals the empowerment of the position of the data subject, and in particular, the 
strengthening of control over personal data, creates the basis for the assumption that the 
regulation creates a property-like protection regime for personal data. 
 
Nevertheless, when discussing the possibility of the existence of property rights to personal 
data in the European legal order, special attention should be paid to the Union's approach to  
defining the right to protection of personal data as a special category of fundamental rights that 
need special protection and enforcement. 
6.1 Is there compliance between property approach and human-centered 
approach to personal data protection? 
 
From a first glance, the answer to the question posed is quite obvious, the fundamental 
approach and the property approach to solving the problem of personal data protection are 
opposite to each other. And the proprietary approach is pursuing economic goals of the right 
holder, which is true for American legal order, and the fundamental approach, which in 
deployed in Europe, puts respect and ensuring fundamental rights and freedoms of 
individual at the head of discussion. 
 
However, it is not so evident. The right to the protection of personal data is recognized by 
the Union as a fundamental right. And the property right presupposes the freedom of the 
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right holder in the disposal and use of his property. Therefore, a logical question 
immediately arises. If a property right over personal data to be recognized, then does this 
mean that a person will be able to waive his fundamental right, exercising his right to 
freedom to dispose of his property. 
 
Such a possibility exists, and the law enforcement authorities represented by the European 
Court of Human Rights repeatedly supported this in its decisions200. An individual has the 
right to waive his fundamental right on the condition that his will has been expressed in an 
explicit and unambiguous manner. 
 
Moreover, as some authors assert, both fundamental rights and property rights are aimed at 
strengthening the position of and empowering the right holder.201 And both approaches 
indicate the special bond between the subject and object of the right. And since the status of 
a fundamental right does not exclude the possibility of waiver of concerned right, and the 
goal of both approaches is similar, the European legal order does not exclude or prevent the 
possibility of vesting property right in personal data as a more powerful mechanism to 
ensure control of the data subject over personal information pertaining to him. 
 
Granting property right in personal data to data subject will allow him to bargain in his own 
interests, ensuring the autonomy of the individual.202 The autonomy of the individual also 
implies the freedom to conclude the contract and negotiate the terms  and conditions of an 
agreement. The freedom to conclude a contract also provides an opportunity for the parties 
to achieve the desired balance of interests, thus securing mutual rights and obligations in 
the agreement. Property right also ensures an undeniable and most complete control over 
the object of the right. 
 
Moreover, recognizing that objectively the data subject in a given relationship will always 
be a weak party, freedom of contract does not mean the possibility of concluding a contract 
that would harm the interests and rights of the weaker party. General principles of private 
law always defend the interests of the weaker side.203 
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6.2 The propertisation of personal data within the boundaries of General Data 
Protection Regulation 
 
The main argument of the followers of the proportization approach is the already existing 
proprietary control of data subjects over personal data, which manifests itself through the 
mechanism of informed and specific consent to the collection and processing of personal data. 
As proponents of property regime assert it is the requirement of consent that establishes the 
unambiguous and strong control of the data subject over his personal data, which serves as a 
prerequisite for the discussions of the possibility of the property right over personal data in the 
EU legal system.204 
 
Also, according to the GDPR, one of the requirements for lawful data processing based on 
consent is the explicitly of the given consent. That is, consent has to be expressed not by silence, 
but through affirmative action of data subject. Moreover, the controller is also obliged to inform 
the data subject's right to withdraw his consent to data processing at any time without giving 
reasons and without negative consequences after such revocation. That said, revoking consent 
should be as easy as giving it.205 
 
Even when there are other legal grounds for the processing of personal data, the controller has 
the obligation to provide data subject with all relevant information concerning operations with 
his personal data,206 and, most importantly, about the rights of the data subject to demand 
rectification, erasure of personal data, restrictions of its processing.207 These provisions are 
aimed at maintaining data subjects' control over information pertaining to him. 
 
Thus, even if the processing of data is carried out on grounds other than the consent of the data 
subject, the degree of control of the data subject over his personal data still remains. If the data 
processing is based on other grounds, the data subject is still not deprived of his right to question 
lawfulness of such processing,208 through his right to object.209 
 
Another argument in favor of the possible proportization of personal data within the framework 
of the GDPR is the fact that any restrictions on personal data, for example, the purpose 
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limitation, the requirement of the data subject to rectify or erase personal information, follow 
the asset,210 namely personal data.211 In other words, if the data subject has requested the erasure 
of personal information, then not only the initial controller to whom the request was addressed 
is obliged to comply with this requirement, but also all other data controllers and processors 
who has access to that data,212 even if the data subject himself was not in any legal relationship 
with these third parties.213 The restrictions put by the data subject has a binding effect on any 
third parties since the interest of the data subject is embedded in the data itself.214 
 
Such restrictions also accompany personal data in time, that is, personal data submitted for 
processing for one purpose cannot be freely processed for other purposes in the future. That 
binding effect of restrictions is similar to the erga omnes principle of property right that puts 
the obligations on everyone but not only on the parties of the relevant contract. 
 
The property right to personal data does not necessarily have to be employed in the classical 
sense. Schwartz states that certain limits are necessary in order to ensure the interests of the 
data subject. However, he also believes that personal data protection can benefit from 
proportization. One of these benefits is an affirmative action on information processing. In this 
case, the data subject will retain the right to exit at any time (employing the right to withdraw 
the consent), which will prevent the duration of agreements concluded on terms that are 
unfavorable for the data subject.215 
 
Secondly, such a framework will ensure that control remains in the hands of the data subject, 
who will be able to decide the fate of his data in the future. That is, the data subject can prohibit 
the further transfer or use of his personal information by third parties or for different 
purposes.216 
 
Another argument testifying to the property regime is the goal pursued by the legislator in the 
protection of personal data. Namely, the lawmaker seeks to prevent unwanted deprivation of 
personal data by the other party, which is also the purpose of establishing property rights. Just 
as the GDPR provides for the possibility of data processing with the consent of the data subject, 
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the property regime implies the use of the personal data is possible only with the consent of the 
owner.217 
 
And finally, the GDPR protects the data subject as the weak party creating additional safeguards 
to ensure the interests of data subjects.  Moreover, it provides the data subject with the similar 
legal remedies in case of violation of his right to personal data protection from unlawful 
processing as the property regime for owners whose property rights have been violated.218 
 
Thus, the data subject, through the request for the erasure219 of personal data, can restore the 
position that was before the alleged violation. Also, the data subject can apply directly to the 
court or the supervisory authority for a court order requiring the controller to take certain 
actions, for example, changing, deleting personal data. And, of course, substantially high 
administrative fines,220 penalties221 or compensations 222can be imposed on the violator. 
6.3 What property regime has to offer? 
 
The proponents of the property approach are confident that in order to achieve stronger 
protection of informational privacy, it is necessary to replace the used protection mechanisms 
with a more powerful instrument of the property regime.223 Since the lawmakers deployed the 
approach of privacy as control, property right seem to be the most reliable way to concentrate 
control  in the hands of the data subject, that is, in the hands of the property owner.224 
 
The logic is similar to that of the protection of interests of a copyright holder in controlling and 
limiting the distribution and use of their work. This control is exercised by copyright holders 
through the property rights to their creation. The same scheme should be applied to data subjects 
wishing to control disclosure and use of their personal information without transferring the 
property right itself.225 
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Since the privacy advocates of the propertization approach talk about limited alienability, it is 
proposed to provide the possibility of concluding licensing agreements between the data subject 
and the controller, which would contain all the necessary information, allowing the data subject 
to make an informed decision. If the data subject does not agree to the terms of processing or 
other use of the data pertaining to him, then the processing of such data must be anonymous or 
pseudonymous.226 
 
Moreover, the vesting property rights with personal data will not mean the possibility of 
complete alienation of rights to personal data. In order to tackle  the problem of asymmetry of 
power, as well as to ensure the interests of the data subject, such rights as the right to erasure, 
to rectification of erroneous information, the right to access information, the right to restrict 
processing, the right to withdraw the consent must be inalienable by default.227 That is, 
supporters of this approach are suggesting to introduce a new limited property right over 
personal data.228 
 
In cases where there is an obvious imbalance of power, the rules of private law restrict the 
freedom of the powerful party and assigns additional obligations to the more competent party, 
(for instance,  the obligation to provide full information).229 So the property regime also has the 
appropriate instruments to protect the weaker party to the agreement. 
 
Thus, the data subject will have undeniable control over personal data, and also the data subject 
will be given the freedom to conclude a contract. Through licensing agreements, the data subject 
will not transfer the property right in his data, but only a limited right to use it. The parties will 
be able to agree on the (im)possibility of the subsequent transfer of data to a third party, having 
discussed the benefits accorded to the data subject as well. And in the case where the controller 
does not comply with his contractual obligations, then the data subject has the right to revoke 
his license (just as according to the GDPR, the data subject has the inalienable right to withdraw  
the consent). In this way, it will be possible to achieve a greater awareness of the data subject 
about the terms and conditions to which he gives his consent since it would require his active 
participation in drawing the provisions of the agreement.230 
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According to proponents of proportization, the property regime will establish a default rule, 
consent will become the priority ground for personal data processing, which will further 
strengthen the control of data subjects over personal information. The interests of the data 
subject in such circumstances will always prevail over the interests of the controller.231 Also, 
the vesting property right in personal data will encourage controllers and processors to apply 
measures and technologies that secure stronger protection of personal data. That will also 
contribute to creating greater incentives for businesses to respect and regard data subjects’ 
interests.232 
 
One of the main benefits of a proportization approach is the erga omnes effect, which will 
address the issue of responsibility and accountability of all parties in personal data processing 
in a uniform and universal way. Given the intricate data transmission chain, the widespread use 
of outsource services by controllers, the principle of erga omnes will ease the process of 
protecting data subjects’ right in case of violation. The property regime will also create a 
negative obligation for all third parties to refrain from committing actions that violate the right 
of the data subject.233 
 
Hence, the categorization of the parties involved in the processing of personal data will not 
make any difference. The data subject will not have to figure out who got access to his data, 
who provided his personal data, he will be able to lodge a complaint against any actor who is 
involved in wrongful operations using his personal data.234 
 
Some authors also pay great attention to the advantages of using proprietary legal remedies.235 
The proprietary data protection regime also has advantages when it comes to available legal 
remedies for the subject whose rights have been violated. Contractual rights or tort rights are 
protected by compensation for the damage caused. While property rights are enforced by court 
injunctions.236 
 
Under the property regime, the controller who has violated the data subject's right will not be 
able to get off with the payment of a fine. An unfair controller can fall under criminal penalties, 
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a judicial order, and incomparably high fines. And in general, the property regime will not allow 
the controller to process personal data without authorization of the data subject, without any 
exceptions.237 
 
It is also assumed that with the assignment of property right over personal data to data subjects, 
entities will bear the cost of collecting and processing data, since at the moment the conditions 
are such that the collection and implementation of data is carried out by them freely, and only 
companies benefit from the use of personal data.238 
 
Moreover, the recognition of property right of data subjects will dot the issue of who owns the 
data, unambiguously asserting the rights to the data subjects, and not to the company that 
collects and processes personal information.239 
6.4 Conclusion 
 
The European legal system following the human-centered approach does not necessarily deny 
the possibility of using the property regime to ensure stronger protection of personal data. Both 
approaches pursue the same goal, strengthening the position of the data subject by exercising 
control over personal data pertaining to him. Both approaches aim at resolving power 
imbalances between the controller and the data subject, as well as providing stricter rules of 
accountability and responsibility for those handling personal data. 
 
As well as the European approach, the property right approach uses the tool of unambiguous 
and informed consent to the data processing as a control mechanism for data subjects. And the 
right to information, the right to request rectification or erasure ensure control over the data in 
cases when the data processing was carried out on other grounds. 
 
According to the GDPR, all restrictions in relation to the purpose of processing personal data, 
or the requirement of the data subject to limit the processing, change or erase personal data 
follow the personal data when they are transferred to other controllers or processors. That is, 
the restrictions and requirements of the data subject have a binding effect not only for the 
original controller who was the party of the contract but also for everyone else who was not 
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directly involved into the original collection and processing of data. The principle of erga omnes 
of property rights resolves the issue of accountability and responsibility of all third parties in a 
very clear manner. 
 
Also, the data subject, having the property right to personal data, will be able to actively 
negotiate on the terms and conditions of use of his data that would be more favorable for data 
subject, which is supposedly the best way to provide an informed decision on the processing of 
personal data. And the rules of private law can provide protection for the weaker party, imposing 
additional obligations on the more competent party. 
 
The proponents of the property regime approach are convinced that in order to ensure the strong 
position of the data subject, it is necessary to use the mechanism that presupposes the most 





























Undoubtedly, the property regime for the protection of personal data has several advantages. 
Among the main ones, the most complete control of the data subject over personal data can be 
emphasized. The property regime allows the owner to exercise his right against everyone, which 
already implies a strong position of data subject. 
 
Nevertheless, before deciding on the need for a new regime and approach for personal data 
protection, it is necessary to weigh the risks and threats that property regime on personal data 
may entail. It is also necessary to assess the existing and applied protection mechanism to 
understand if the system needs to apply a new regulation approach to the concerned relations. 
Even though the previous regulation did not provide an adequate level of personal data 
protection given the constantly emerging challenges caused by the technological breakthrough 
of society, the GDPR took into account the mistakes of the past and made certain steps to 
achieve the goals of empowering data subjects and retaining their control over personal data. 
 
7.1 Right to self-determination & right to data protection 
 
 
For the first time, the concept of the right to self-determination was given by the German 
Constitutional Court in 1983 in its decision rendered based on Article 1 (the right to dignity) 
and Article 2 (personality right) of the Constitution, which stated that the right to self-
determination is the right of everyone to determine himself to whom, when, and to what extent 
he wants to disclose information about himself,240 right of exercising control over personal 
information. 
 
If an individual is deprived of the right to exercise control over personal information pertaining 
to him, then such a circumstance will have a detrimental effect on self-development, preventing 
the individual from building his behavior, his views, and beliefs without fear of constant 
observation and judgment.  In its turn, that will make the functioning of a democratic society 
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impossible.241 That is, the right to self-determination has a value not only for an individual but 
is also a core principle of any democratic society.242 
 
The reality now is that policymakers and lawmakers are overwhelmingly encouraging 
transparency and disclosure of personal data, backing it up with the significance of the free flow 
of information and access to information. Such a tendency can most likely have a pernicious 
effect on the position of the right to personal data protection, and hence the right to self-
determination, in the system of generic values.243 
 
By collecting, processing, profiling, storing personal data, public and private parties make 
decisions about the data subject on the basis of the available information about the individual. 
It makes the individual's right to determine his personhood and behavior meaningless since his 
digital personality has already been built by various actors who have access to personal 
information pertaining to a concerned individual without the participation of the data subject 
himself.244 
 
Some authors, even before securing the right to protect personal data as a fundamental right, 
were highly concerned about it and anticipated the threats that such recognition could entail. In 
the era of "possessive individualism”, if the right to the protection of personal data is recognized 
as an independent value, then data subjects will not hesitate to commodify personal information 
and immediately receive remuneration for its disclosure and use.245 
 
When the right to the protection of personal data acts as a tool for ensuring and achieving 
personal autonomy from outside influence and interference, the person is not endowed with the 
right to dispose or alienate his right. Such exploitation of the right to the protection of personal 
data as an intermediate tool intended to guarantee the right to self-determination that has a 
higher value both for an individual and for society as a whole.246 
 
However, it must be noted that the right to informational self-determination is not limited to 
personal data as such, but it consists of exercising control of the data subject over personal 
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information when it accordingly shapes his life.247 The GDPR as its main goal set the 
empowering the position of the data subject through exercising control over personal data. That 
is, the Regulation provides the data subject with the real possibility for self-determination and 
self-management of his data. 
 
The right to self-determination and the right to personal data protection have the vital goal of 
limiting the actions of public and private parties to collect, process, use personal data. In the era 
of an exponential development of information technology, otherwise would create a threat to 
exert strong pressure on individuals to refrain from actions, decisions that, being known to 
everyone, could harm their personal interests. It is particularly relevant for instances when the 
collection or processing of discreditable or shaming information is carried out, which the data 
subject would prefer to keep secret.248 It is for these reasons the Regulation also enshrines 
provisions on a special category of information249, for example, about race, religious or political 
beliefs, sexual orientation, which may become the basis for subsequent discrimination. 
 
The main threat for an individual is not simply about data disclosure, but that the collection and 
combination of various information about one data subject may jeopardize the exercise of other 
rights of the data subject (right to privacy, non-discrimination, equal treatment) .250 
 
It is apparent that given the imbalance of power between the individuals and public and private 
entities, and the possibility of abuse of that power, the simple acknowledgment of  the right to 
self-determination and to personal data protection is insufficient. Therefore, despite the fact that 
the right to privacy (which was broadly interpreted encompassing the right to make free 
choices251) in the classical doctrinal sense imposes a negative obligation on the state to refrain 
from exercising any control over aspects of the life of individuals, the European Court of 
Human Rights expanded the state's obligation by imposing positive obligations on the state to 
take the necessary measures and decisions that will facilitate the right to privacy.252 
 
But still the autonomy and self-determination of an individual cannot be regulated by laws. 
With the help of laws and regulations, it is possible to create only favorable conditions and 
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opportunities for the individual, so that he can freely decide for himself what life he wants to 
live, what personhood he wants to develop.253 And the Regulation creates such an environment 
in which these rights remain meaningful and enforceable. 
 
The development of new technologies, new ways, and methods of collecting, processing, 
storing data sets new  challenges for the autonomy and self-determination of the individual.254 
Therefore, the regulation of personal data protection, namely the General Data Protection 
Regulation, is designed to ensure the fundamental values of human dignity and his right to self-
determination and self-development. Hence, interpretation, application, and enforcement of 
relevant legal provisions should be carried out in the light of these values. 
 
As mentioned earlier, the right to self-determination, the right to exercise control over personal 
data, is of tremendous importance for a democratic society.255 Ensuring the right to self-
determination and control over personal data contributes to the free exercise and enjoyment by 
an individual of his rights and freedoms, for example, freedom of expression, freedom of 
organization. That is why it is impossible to transfer these rights and values to self-regulation 
for the individuals themselves, and especially for private enterprises, since these rights have 
value not only exclusively for the interests of an individual but are of great importance for the 
functioning and mere existence of democratic society and liberty.256 
7.2 Consent as a mechanism of control 
 
The GDPR pays great attention to the regulation of the consent of the data subject as the basis 
for the legitimacy of the personal data processing and as the mechanism of exercising control 
over personal data. The definition of consent is enshrined in Article 4 (11), which defines 
consent as: 
 
… freely given, specific, informed and unambiguous indication of the data subject's 
wishes by which he or she, by a statement or by a clear affirmative action, signifies 
agreement to the processing of personal data relating to him or her; 
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By definition, the processing of personal information will only be lawful if certain conditions 
are met. First, the consent must express the true and free will of the data subject, consent given 
under any coercion, deception, delusion is invalid. Secondly, the consent must be specific and 
informed, that is, the data subject must know for which specific one purpose of data processing 
he consents to. At the same time, the legislator emphasizes that each new purpose for processing 
requires a separate consent257 accompanying every request for the consent with relevant 
information.258 And the requirement of specific consent is one of the innovations of the GDPR 
in comparison with the previous Directive.259 Finally, consent must be given through an 
endorsement act. The controller cannot use the default consent mechanism, or silence as 
consent, or the so-called opt-out.260 
 
In addition to the requirements for valid consent, the legislator also obliges the controller to 
inform the data subject of his right to revoke a previously given consent.261 
 
Though the actual control of the data subject is ensured not simply by the consent mechanism 
for the processing of personal data, but by the fact that the controller must obtain separate 
consent for each new purpose of data processing.262 By agreeing once to the collection and 
processing of data, the data subject does not alienate the right to use his personal data, but only 
sanctions the processing of data for a specific and clear purpose, which has been determined by 
the controller. Any processing of data for a vague, ambiguous, amorphous purpose would 
automatically deprive the data subject of control since such manipulation would grant the 
controller substantial discretion in arbitrary processing of the data. 
 
Also, a greater degree of control to the data subject grants the subject's right to information263 
about the controller's personality, purposes, and means of processing, information about other 
rights of the data subject, which must be provided by the controller himself. Such an obligation 
of the controller to provide the information is intended to make sure that the given consent is 
based on the informed decision of the data subject. 
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7.3 Challenging efficiency of consent mechanism 
 
 
As some proponents264 of the proprietary regime claim recognition of property right over 
personal data will contribute to more responsible treatment of personal data by both data 
subjects and controllers, which will already achieve adequate protection of personal data. If the 
data subjects are convinced that they are the owners of their data, then the mechanism of simple 
consent to the collection and processing of data will be sufficient, since the data subject himself 
will take measures to better protect his data, giving his personal information a higher value as 
his property. So, the mechanism of already applied consent to the collection and processing of 
data is asserted to be sufficient.265 
 
Proponents of the property regime to personal data protection see the proprietary control of data 
subjects over their personal data in the consent mechanism for data processing. However, the 
Regulation does not talk about the alienation of personal data after giving consent, there is not 
even a subtle hint of this in the Regulation. Firstly, even if the data subject has given his consent 
to the processing of his personal information, and it subsequently turns out that the controller 
has obviously collected excessive data that are not necessary for the purposes of the processing, 
such consent will be invalid, even if it was freely given by the subject data without pressure and 
coercion. Secondly, the legislator speaks of the right to revoke the  consent previously given to 
data processing. Moreover, a special reservation has been made that there are no exceptions to 
this rule266, the data subject reserves the right to withdraw consent to data processing at any 
time without any subsequent adverse consequences due to such a decision. 
 
Also, the concept of incompatibility of the purpose of processing, which is utilized by the 
legislator, does not bring more certainty, but, on the contrary, gives a certain margin of 
appreciation for the controller of personal data. Many businesses collect personal user data for 
their networking, such information can be stored in the database for a long time, and this data 
can be used in the future by this business, which seems to be a compatible purpose, but 
nevertheless, data subjects may not be able to foresee or expect such a long term storage of his 
or her personal data.267 
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Even though consent plays a meaningful role in the European data protection system, the 
legislator does not link the legitimacy of data collection and processing solely with the consent 
of the data subject. According to Article 6 of the Regulation, in order for the action of data 
processing to be lawful, the controller must comply with at least one of the conditions listed in 
this Article. That is, the controller is not always obliged to obtain the consent of the data subject 
to the processing of his data if he can justify the need for processing by other grounds, enshrined 
in Article 6.268 And no legal act makes the obtaining of the consent of the data subject more 
preferable over all other grounds for the legal processing of personal data.269 
 
In many cases, the controller will be able to justify the legitimacy of the processing of personal 
data on other grounds270 enshrined in Article6(1) of the GDPR. The proponents of the property 
regime do not bring more clarity to how the owner of personal data can exercise his right where 
processing was carried out on legal grounds for processing personal data other than consent. 
 
The general position of the policy  and lawmakers is that data processing based solely on the 
consent of the data subject may have a detrimental effect on the data subject's own interests,271 
since the prevailing factor is the incompetence of the data subject in an adequate assessment of 
the risks of processing personal data pertaining to him, or the special position of the data subject, 
which prevents him from making a free and informed decision. 
 
The main purpose of the consent tool is to exercise control over personal information by data 
subjects. However, this mechanism has many pitfalls and can hardly be considered an effective 
mechanism for retaining control over personal data in the hands of the data subjects themselves. 
 
The current reality is that every person spends hours every single day surfing the Internet. It is 
very doubtful that each user will mindfully read the information regarding who processes 
personal data, what data, and for what purposes. Due to the endless notifications of the same 
type and requests for consent to processing operations, we have already managed to develop 
the habit of automatically ticking the box where it is required in order to further freely use 
wanted services and web pages.272 
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The introduction of the property right to personal data will make consent a preferable ground 
for personal data processing, and maybe even as a default rule. This will shift a great deal of 
responsibility onto the shoulders of the data subjects, which can be too burdensome, since the 
data subjects will have to keep the track of where, what data, for what purpose, to whom they 
give their consent for processing. And with dozens of different controllers handling our data on 
a daily basis, this would be cumbersome and too risky. One should seriously consider whether 
this universal mechanism is desirable for the data subjects themselves. 
 
Some authors are convinced that obtaining consent from a data subject for the controller is a 
kind of routine work, satisfying the requirements for valid consent is not a big deal for those 
entities, therefore it is considered that there is no serious perception of the consent mechanism 
as a real control tool.273 
 
Understanding this, many controllers may abuse users’ negligence with their personal data, and 
request the collection of excessive and unnecessary data that can be used for purposes that were 
not mentioned in an initial request for the data collection and processing.274 Under such 
circumstances, it is extremely difficult to talk about exercising any real control over the data. 
 
Moreover, consent cannot solve the main problem in the relationship between data subjects and 
controllers, namely the asymmetry of power. In any case, it will be difficult for the data subject 
to control the compliance of the third actors (for example, another controller, processor) with 
the agreement that was concluded with the original controller.275 
 
That is why the legislator ensures that control over personal data is retained276 even after giving 
consent for data processing through the data subject's right to withdraw consent to the 
processing of personal information.277 The control is retained also by a number of rights 
enshrined in the Regulation, namely the right to require the controller to restrict processing or 
to delete the stored data, right to rectification or completion of data, and also principles of the 
GDPR plays the core role in correcting the imbalance of power. And none of these rights can 
be waived by the agreement.278 
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Another problem with the effectiveness and vulnerability of consent as a legal basis for personal 
data processing is mentioned in the text of the Regulation itself, in Recital 43, the legislator 
foresaw frequent cases when the data subject is in a dependent position when obtaining consent 
cannot be considered valid due to the actual lack of freedom of choice. For such legal entities, 
when there is an obvious inconsistency of power, the consent of the data subject to the 
processing of personal information is not a lawful basis for processing. In these cases, the 
controller must be guided by other legal grounds for processing personal data.279 The legislator 
has prevented in advance the adverse consequences of the absolute validity of consent and 
absolute control of data subjects over personal information. 
 
For instance, in labor relations, when an employee must give his consent to the collection and 
processing of his personal data, then the mechanism of consent as control is quite meaningless 
and it fails its task of free and independent expression of the will of the data subject. It is 
apparent that when the employer confronts the fact of the need to process the data of his 
subordinates, de facto employees are excluded from any freedom of decision, they simply have 
no choice280, since disagreement can cause unfavorable consequences for the employee.281 
 
In many cases, even if the controller has received the consent of the data subject to process the 
data, this is not a guarantee that the processing was carried out on a legitimate basis, because 
the moment of deception, coercion is omnipresent. And in some cases, consent as the basis for 
the processing of personal data is not recommended at all due to the contextual specifics, such 
as the transfer of personal data outside the EU or dependent position of the data subject.282 
 
Thus, the legislator deliberately limits the universality of consent as a basis for the processing 
of personal information, as otherwise could have pernicious consequences for the interests of 
data subjects, and as was stated in the previous paragraph, for the interests of the society as 
well. 
 
Interestingly, Mireille singles out the European approach to balancing the disparity of powers, 
as she calls it the“EU-style data protection” approach, as distinct from the approach of vesting 
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property rights with data subjects. And here, as the root of the European approach, she notes 
the principles enshrined in personal data protection regulations. And as the main advantage of 
the European approach, Mireille notes the ability of the European approach to deal with the 
problems and challenges imposed by modern technologies and the threats that they entail.283 
 
7.4 Does property regime fit in General Data Protection Regulation? 
 
The imperfection of the consent mechanism is not the only argument testing the claimed 
effectiveness of the property regime. First of all, the property regime imposes negative 
obligations on all third parties not to interfere with the owner's right to dispose of and use his 
property. While the right to the protection of personal data in accordance with both the Charter 
of Fundamental Rights and the GDPR establishes positive rights and obligations. 
 
The relationship between the controller and the data subject is clearly and in detail regulated by 
law, leaving almost no freedom to negotiate on the terms and conditions of the contract. The 
Regulation does not allow the parties to negotiate deviations from its provisions. 
 
In contrast to the Directive, the GDPR explicitly stands up for the weaker side, that is, given 
the imbalance of power and information in controlling dissemination and use of personal data. 
That is why the provisions of the Regulation and its general principles are imperative and have 
direct application and binding effect, and the level of protection of personal data, established 
by the Regulation, is mandatory for all controllers, processors dealing with the processing and 
other use of data. Therefore, the GDPR does not leave the freedom either to the data subject or 
the controller to bargain and conclude contracts for the collection, use, transfer of personal data. 
 
Given the fact that the GDPR establishes a minimum framework regulation, minimum 
standards for the protection of personal data across the EU, the parties cannot agree, for 
example, on "softening" the controller's obligations and responsibility. The regulation also 
addresses the issue of what data can be processed by enforcing the principle of minimization 
which will not allow the controller to collect and process excessive information even if the data 
subject is willing to give his consent to the excessive collection.284 
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Data processing with the consent of the data subject is indisputably the cornerstone of the 
Regulation and the European approach to the protection of personal data. Nevertheless, despite 
the fact that policymakers and lawmakers pin great hopes on this control mechanism, believing 
that this is the main tool for exercising real control over personal data, in reality, the situation 
is quite opposite. 
 
Unfortunately, the consent tool has many shortcomings, and this mechanism is easily 
manipulated by controllers, who actually establish and impose their own conditions for the 
collection, processing, and storage of personal data, leaving no real freedom of choice for the 
data subject. 
 
The GDPR does not prohibit the processing of personal data without the assent of the data 
subject, it is not assumed that the processing of data depends exclusively on the decision and 
will of the subject himself. But the Regulation enshrines provisions that ensure fair data 
processing and other use that respects the rights and freedoms of the individual as promised by 
the Union. Not only the data subject cares about his interests and freedoms, but the provisions 
of the Regulation are aimed at using the most effective mechanisms for the implementation of 
these interests. 
 
The great complexity of the relationship for the processing of personal data is the imbalance of 
power, which cannot be resolved by the consent mechanism alone. That is why the legislator 
did not limit himself to the consent mechanism, realizing that this tool is not enough, equipping 
the data subject with other rights, enhancing the accountability of the controllers, encouraging 
the incentives to develop and employ privacy-enhancing technologies, ensuring effective 
judicial and administrative rules that can in conjunction balance the position of the data subject 
and the controller. 
 
And none of the data subject's rights enshrined in the provisions of the GDPR for his 
empowerment can be considered as a property right.285 But still under the terms of the 
Regulation, there is no doubt that the interests of the data subject prevail over the interests of 
the controller. The introduction of ownership of personal data will not bring anything new in 
this aspect. The burden of proof of the overriding interest of the controller itself lies with the 
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controller itself286. Thus, Regulation as a default rule already puts the dominance of the subject's 
interests over the interests of the controller. 
 
The implementation of the property regime is also not able to solve the problem of already 
collected, stored personal data before the introduction property right to personal data. Whereas 
the general principles of the GDPR solve these issues through the principle of data minimization 
and storage limitations that is applicable to any personal data inclusive data collected before the 
GDPR came to force and application. 
 
The Regulation has become a useful reform in the protection of personal data, which universally 
applies to any actor that processes personal data, namely controllers and processorss. The 
GDPR appears to be a promising tool for solving new challenges posed by the development of 
communication and information technologies, and new business models.287 Unlike its 
predecessor, the 1995 Directive, the Regulation enshrines strong accountability and 
responsibility rules of controllers for the processing of personal data that does not comply with 
general principles for data processing. 
 
The GDPR also perfectly reflects the European approach to the protection of personal data as a 
fundamental right, securing additional guarantees to protect the interests of data subjects from 
the bad faith of controllers. Expansion of the rights of data subjects, which cannot be 
circumvented by the provisions of the agreement, significantly strengthens the position of the 
data subject, giving him greater control over the operations carried out with information 
pertaining to him. This human-centered approach does not completely, but to some extent 
corrects the imbalance of power in the concerned relationship, where the data subject is 
obviously the weaker and incompetent party. 
7.5 Is property regime solving intricacies of data protection in the EU? 
 
The exponential advancement of technology only exacerbates the asymmetry of power between 
controllers and data subjects.288 Modern information technology allows the storage and 
collection of an unlimited amount of data. And the growing importance and attractiveness of 
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the information market are pushing controllers to endlessly invent new goals for collecting and 
processing data.289 
 
In a utilitarian society, it is worth doubly weighing the pros and cons of creating a new property, 
and assessing how the owners will wish to dispose of their property. And would not such right 
and its enjoyment jeopardize other values? 
 
In the case of databases, the legislation explicitly recognizes the property right of enterprises in 
the created databases in order to justify their large investment in data compilation.290 The 
compilation of personal data of thousands users has a high economic value, and it is considered 
to be a valuable business asset. Here the economic interest of creators in their creations – 
databases – is completely justified. 
 
In the case of protecting the personal data of the user/data subject himself, this fundamental 
right does not serve any economic purpose, it is aimed at the implementation of other interests. 
 
The proposal to regulate the property right over personal data, similar to the intellectual property 
regime, lacks sufficient argumentation. When some authors291 suggest using the logic of an 
intellectual property law regime, where property rights are also somewhat limited, it should be 
understood that the holders of the intellectual property rights have an economic interest in 
exploiting their rights, as a result of which the whole society will benefit. 
 
That is, the legislator deliberately vested property right in the results of intellectual activity with 
the inventor in order, firstly, to reimburse those intellectual, creative investments of the creator, 
and, secondly, to encourage the creator to disclose the results of his work, which have a huge 
contribution to the creative, scientific development of society in general. 
 
The mentioned examples of a special property regime for certain categories of property, such 
pursue the goal of protecting the economic interests of the owner. 
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Talking about personal data, there is no such goal as encouraging the disclosure or 
dissemination of information, on the contrary, the protection of personal data is aimed at 
preventing excessive and unnecessary collection and processing of personal information. It is 
particularly crucial when it comes to the role of data control in the exercise of the right to 
privacy, the right to self-determination, right not to be the subject of discrimination. In that 
context, it is difficult to argue about the protection of personal data for the sake of the property 
interests of the data subject.292 
 
It is a controversial argument that the recognition of property rights in personal data will affect 
data subjects' perception of the importance of personal information, and will contribute to 
encouraging data subjects to exercise effective and meaningful control over personal data. As 
an example, each user of various digital services indicates that data subjects do not accord much 
value to their personal data, providing it freely to dozens of social networks, viewed by 
thousands of other users.293 
 
The right to personal data protection means the protection of personal data from unauthorized 
disclosure and use of personal data. In no way does any of the legal acts speak of the protection 
of personal data as protecting the proprietary or economic interests of the subjects of personal 
data in the use or disclosure of personal information pertaining to them. 
 
Moreover, if the protection of personal data were carried out under a property regime, then the 
data subject would be deprived of the help of the competent authorities in defending their 
interests. The burden of discovering the misuse of personal data concerning him would lay on 
the data subject, that in the context of the imbalance of power and information would have been 
virtually impossible. 
 
Moreover, the application of the property regime for the protection of personal data will nullify 
all the efforts of the legislator to achieve harmonized regulation. The GDPR is a framework act, 
which, nevertheless, establishes a fairly detailed and defined standard and level of protection. 
While the property right is left to the discretion of the national laws of the Member States, and 
each government can adapt property law to the peculiarities of its economic and social policies. 
This means that with the transition to a property regime for regulating the rights to personal 
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data, the EU will have an extremely fragmented regulation, which will inevitably lead to the 
disruption of the single market. At the moment, thousands of services are provided in digital 
format, online, so the GDPR is of invaluable practical importance for the new online market. 
While in America the goal of harmonization of regulation of certain relations is not set before 
the legislation, the EU has long adhered to the goal of harmonization in various aspects, and the 
property approach can in no way become an instrument for achieving the goals of 
harmonization. 
 
And lastly, if the data subject has property right to personal data, then he has the right to give 
them his own assessment of the value. Thus, the right to protection of personal data under the 
property regime will have different values depending on the socio-economic status of the data 
subject as was warned by Schwartz. 
 
The main problem with personal data protection boils down to the failure of the market to cope 
with the task of disciplining businesses to refrain from unauthorized use of personal data and 
ensure transparent and fair use of personal data.294 And the property right regime does not offer 
any solutions to intricacies of efficient personal data protection that the actors and the market 
itself cannot cope with. So, the question of how the property regime in personal data will 
contribute to a better regulatory solution remains open. 
 
The right to protection of personal data is not so much about the right of the data subject not to 
disclose information about himself or bargain on the terms of such disclosure. The right to the 
protection of personal data ensures the transparency of any operations performed with the use 
of personal data so that the data subject knows that his information is being processed for 
purposes known to him. And the GDPR has done a good work to ensure that transparency. 
7.6 Conclusion 
 
Before deciding on the need to apply a new approach to regulation and protection of the right, 
it is necessary to assess the existing mechanisms, their effectiveness in achieving the set goals. 
 
The European legal system takes a fundamental approach to the protection of personal data. 
Information privacy and the right to the protection of personal data are vital for the realization 
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of self-determination and self-development of individuals, for the right of an individual to build 
and shape his own life and personality without pressure and fear. This right is essential not only 
for the individual but also for society as a whole. The right to personal data protection not only 
boils down to data control but also has an important role in protecting and exercising other 
fundamental rights. 
 
For these reasons, transferring the protection of personal data primarily to self-regulation and 
own discretion is risky for the freedom of the individual himself. 
 
While proponents of the property regime believe that property regime itself guarantees greater 
respect for the protection of personal data by both the data subject and the controller, the consent 
tool has many flaws to rely on as the primary control mechanism. Therefore, the legislator does 
not link the legitimacy of data processing solely to the compliance with the consent requirement 
and does not give this ground priority over others. 
 
The property regime is difficult to apply in the context of the GDPR, which does not leave the 
freedom to negotiate derogations from its rules. The GDPR also does not grant the data subject's 
rights to bargain with his data or the right to use it. The regulation sets out minimum standards 
for the protection of personal data, and no departure from this level is permissible on any 
grounds. The aim of the legislator was not to provide freedom to use their data at their discretion 
but to ensure fair data processing by tackling the imbalance of power between the controller 
and the data subject, who was previously deprived of meaningful control over personal 
information. 
 
The goal of EU in reaching the harmonized regulation across Member States and ensure smooth 
functioning of the single market cannot be achieved by property right regime because property 
law left to the discretion of national legislators. 
 
The protection of personal data can in no sense pursue the economic or property interests of the 
data subject. Otherwise, it would inevitably lead to the commodification of the personal data, 
as is the case with intellectual property rights or databases. And that is an undesirable 
implication for the interests of the data subject. 
 
Therefore, the Regulation is a good attempt to ensure the effective protection of personal data, 
guided by the value of human integrity and autonomy. While it is not without its shortcomings, 
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some effort must be made to address the unresolved issues with harmonization and 
implementation of all available empowerment mechanisms by the data subjects. The Regulation 







The theory of proportization of personal data emerged against the backdrop of the shortcomings 
of the American legal system, which was unable to provide adequate protection of the interests 
of data subjects against the interests of private companies that abuse their influence and power 
in the unauthorized and unfair use of users' personal data. The tort system has partial application 
and has no preventive action, and the law on personal data protection is highly fragmented and 
has limited application. Therefore, American legal scholars, understanding the corruption of the 
legislative system, trying to avoid the biased legislating process have found an alternative in 
using the existing regimes for the protection of rights to new relationships. Although, it should 
be noted that the drafted Code of Fair Information Practice, and most importantly, the principles 
of fair processing of personal data enshrined in this code, had great potential in solving 
problems posed by modern technologies. 
 
In the European context, this proportization tool does not make as much sense as in the 
American system. The new Regulation that has a direct binding effect on all controllers and 
processors of personal data, replacing the 1995 Directive, enshrines the fundamental principles 
that were also emphasized by the Code of Fair Information Practice. 
 
Moreover, the American legal system does not aim to harmonize regulation between states, that 
is why the property regime for personal data can be considered as an appropriate tool for the 
American system. Meanwhile, Regulation has taken significant steps to achieve harmonization 
in the EU, and property law being in the competence of the national legislators does not match 
the goals of the EU. 
 
Moreover, the property right protects conventionally protects the economic interests of the 
owner. The right to personal data protection is not intended to satisfy the economic interests of 
the parties. The protection of personal data is a mandatory factor in the implementation of other 
fundamental human rights that ensure the autonomy and integrity of the individual. Guided by 
this value, the legislator enshrines the principles of highly restrictive controllers' actions and 
provides strong protection for the weak and incompetent position of the data subject. 
 
New rights of data subjects enshrined in the Regulation, rules of accountability and 
responsibility of controllers and processors, especially established by the authorities for the 
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protection of personal data, all of these tools are aimed at strengthening data subjects and 
keeping them in control of personal information. 
 
The property regime has nothing to offer the European legal order since the gaps existing in the 
previous acts were mostly filled with the provisions of the new Regulation. The goals of 
harmonization and greater respect for the individual’s autonomy and self-integrity are hard to 
achieve by the property right approach. In the context of European law, the property regime 
poses more threats to the effective protection of personal data than it has a positive impact. 
Steps taken towards the commodification of personal data can jeopardize the right to autonomy 
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